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ABSTRACT 
This study examines whether reference levels change over time and the impact on 
individuals‟ risk-taking behavior.  I apply expectations-based reference-dependent 
preferences theory to analyze whether individuals‟ reference levels change over time in 
an economic setting.  The theory suggests that individuals develop reference levels based 
on expectations of future outcomes (Koszegi and Rabin 2006).  Therefore, this study 
examines whether individuals‟ expectations affect the setting of their reference level and 
how possible changes in reference levels affect subsequent risk-taking behavior.  This 
study also provides evidence on how budget-based contracts impact individual risk taking 
behavior in a single period setting.  Prior research has used multiple theories in an 
attempt to explain contradictory results relating to budget target difficulty and risk-taking 
behaviors.  This study provides more evidence to the literature by further examining the 
impact of budget-based contracts on individuals‟ risk-taking behavior. A 1 x 2 between 
subjects experiment was conducted over five periods.  Budget target was the manipulated 
factor at two levels: easy and moderate.  Results suggest that individuals under easy 
budget targets make riskier decisions.  Additionally, individuals‟ reference levels change 
over time and the change in reference level is greater for those individuals who 
continually attain their budget target, suggesting that expectations do increase the 
reference level.  Lastly, in the current study, changes in reference level do not have a 
significant impact on risky decision making.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Questions and Motivation 
Budgeting is an important activity in management accounting and an essential 
business process for most organizations.  Budgets are used by virtually all organizations 
for a variety of reasons.  They can be used to plan and coordinate activities and they can 
also be used to motivate, evaluate, and reward performance (Baiman and Demski 1980; 
Baiman 1990; Luft and Shields 2003).  In designing an incentive compensation system, 
many organizations choose to incorporate budget-based measures into their contracts in 
order to influence behavior and align owner and employee interests (Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle, and Young 2000; Murphy 2001).  Budgets influence behavior by directing 
employee attention towards desirable actions and by creating performance standards 
against which actual performance is judged (Bonner et al. 2000; Sprinkle 2003).   
  The majority of research examining the impact of budget-based contracts 
on employee behaviors examines effort-intensive tasks (Bonner et al. 2000).  Few studies 
examine the impact of budget-based contracts on employee risk-taking behavior (Chow, 
Kohlmeyer, and Wu 2007; Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008) and even fewer 
examine the effectiveness of budget-based contracts over time.  Organizations that use 
incentive contracts expect that these contracts will be effective over multiple periods.  
This study investigates whether incentive contracts, specifically budget-based contracts, 
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maintain their desired effectiveness over time.  Specifically, the effectiveness of a 
budget-based contract could be dependent on individuals‟ reference levels, which may 
not remain constant over time, but rather could vary based on prior economic outcomes, 
or the attainment (or failure to attain) the budget target.  Therefore, this study will 
examine how changes in individuals‟ reference levels over time, as a function of meeting 
or failing to meet the budget target, impacts individuals‟ decision making over time. 
Most prior studies analyzing the effects of incentive system design on goal 
congruence examine single period settings (e.g., Chow et al. 2007; Sprinkle et al. 2008).  
An open question is whether incentive system designs maintain their desired effect over 
multiple periods.  It is possible that over time the effectiveness of an incentive system 
could deteriorate or be enhanced due to changes in individuals‟ reference levels, to the 
extent that the reference level could change based on having met (or not met) budget 
targets (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987; Koszegi and Rabin 2006).  
Additionally, decision making theory suggests that reference levels play a vital role in 
individuals‟ decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987).  Therefore, it is 
important to analyze whether reference levels change, and if they do, what is the impact 
on incentive contracts effectiveness. 
 To analyze the aforementioned research question, I apply expectations-
based reference-dependent preferences theory (Koszegi and Rabin 2006).  This theory 
proposes how individuals‟ reference levels are developed.  Expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences theory suggests that expectations, derived from an individuals‟ 
environment, play a critical role in the development of reference levels.  Specifically, 
individuals‟ develop expectations of what is going to occur in a subsequent time period, 
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and these expectations, along with exogenous factors, play a role in the formulation of 
individuals‟ reference levels.  Therefore, this study will examine whether expectations of 
future economic outcomes impact individuals‟ reference levels. 
In addition to analyzing the multi-period effectiveness of budget-based contracts, 
this study also provides empirical evidence on the applicability of security-
potential/aspiration level theory (SP|A).  The effect of budget-based contracts on the level 
of risk an employee is willing to take, has not always provided conclusive results (e.g., 
Chow et al. 2007; Sprinkle et al. 2008).
1
   Most research analyzing risky decision making 
applies prospect theory to describe individual behavior.
2
  Additional theories, such as 
SP|A, may be more applicable in certain situations.  SP|A was developed to describe how 
individuals approach and make risky decisions and to recognize the importance of 
attaining one‟s aspiration level.3  In budget-based contracts, the budget goals can be 
thought of as reference levels and SP|A stresses the importance of the reference level and 
how its achievement, whether guaranteed or not, affects individuals‟ behaviors.  
Therefore, in an economic setting which incorporates budget-based contracts, it is 
possible that SP|A has more explanatory validity than prospect theory in describing 
                                                          
1
 Chow et al. (2007) found that high budget targets lead to higher risk-taking behavior while Sprinkle et al. 
(2008) found that low budget targets lead to higher risk-taking behavior.  An implicit assumption in this 
study is that most firms want their employees to take certain amounts of risk and the design of incentive 
compensation systems can help firms accomplish this objective. 
2
 Prospect theory suggests that individuals use their reference level to code alternatives (outcomes) as gains 
or losses.  Once these alternatives are framed as gains or losses, prospect theory suggests the individuals in 
a loss frame will be risk-seeking and individuals in a gain frame will be risk-averse (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). 
3
 Prospect theory describes a reference level as the reference point.  A reference point is the kink in the 
prospect theory value function at which an individual perceives an outcome as a gain or a loss (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979).  An aspiration level, as described by security-potential/aspiration level theory, is an 
outcome that receives special attention in the decision making process (Lopes 1987).  The term reference 
level, in this study, is a general term that encompasses both reference points and aspiration levels. 
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individuals‟ behaviors.  This study provides additional empirical evidence relating to the 
applicability of SP|A to individual decision making under budget-based contracts.   
The effect of incentive schemes, and particularly budget-based contracts, on 
managers‟ risk-taking behavior is an area that has received little attention in the literature 
(Sprinkle 2003; Sprinkle et al. 2008; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010).  One of the 
fundamental issues firms face when using budget-based contracts is determining the 
attainability of the budget target.  Goal setting theory suggests that firms should set 
difficult but attainable goals which have been shown to increase individuals‟ effort and 
thus increase output.  There is ample empirical evidence to support this claim (e.g., 
Mento, Steel, and Karen 1987; Locke and Latham 1990; 2002; Jeffrey, Onay, and Larrick 
2010).  The results relating to difficult but attainable goals, however, are generally related 
to effort-intensive tasks and tasks with a direct link between effort and output.  The 
question of how budget target difficulty affects risk-taking behavior in tasks that have a 
more tenuous link between effort and output is a less studied area and is the setting of this 
study.  Therefore, this study will also assess how budget-based targets affect individuals‟ 
risk-taking behavior in a setting where the link between effort and output is tenuous. 
1.2. Research Design 
To address the aforementioned research questions a 1 x 2 between-subjects 
experiment was conducted.  The between-subjects factor, budget target level, was 
manipulated at two levels, easy and moderate.
4
  In designing budget-based incentive 
systems, one of the most important aspects is the difficulty of the selected budget target.  
                                                          
4 A difficult budget target level is not included because prospect theory and security-potential/aspiration 
level theory have the same predictions relating to difficult budget targets.  Specifically, for difficult targets 
individuals must be risk-seeking in order to attain the budget target. 
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Prior research suggests that most firms use moderate budget targets, rather than difficult 
budget targets, to encourage employees to attain the budget goals (Merchant and 
Manzoni 1989) and subsequent research suggests firms should use moderate budget 
targets (Fisher, Peffer, and Spinkle 2003).  Therefore, this study incorporates budget 
difficulty as a variable to assess its effects on risk-taking behavior and how budget target 
difficulty may affect individuals‟ reference levels and subsequent behavior.  The 
experiment incorporates five periods in order to assess how individuals‟ reference levels 
change over time and the concomitant effects on risk-taking behavior.  The experimental 
task involves participants selecting from a range of alternatives that vary in level of risk.  
Experimental participants are undergraduate students who received performance-based 
compensation for their participation in the experimental task.  
There are a number of dependent variables in the experiment.  The first is the 
variance of the project that is selected.
5
  Every participant will be presented with seven 
alternatives from which one must be selected.  The alternatives were developed to 
simulate the risk-return continuum, where lower risk alternatives have smaller variances 
and higher risk alternatives have higher variances.  The variances are defined by 
incorporating two factors.  The first factor is the probability of attaining the budget target.  
This factor dictates the likelihood of not attaining (receiving base salary) or attaining the 
budget target (base salary plus variable bonus) and is a simulation of downside risk, 
which provides information relating to the worst case scenario, the receipt of only base 
annual pay (Shapira 1994).  The probability of attaining the budget target directly impacts 
the other component of variance, the difference between the highest and lowest 
                                                          
5 In the experiment “projects” as used in the discussion of the experiment were referred to as products.  The 
term project is used for expositional purposes.   
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compensation amounts if a specific budget target is met.  For low risk alternatives the 
lowest and highest amounts are fairly close together, and the difference between the 
highest and lowest amounts increases as more risk is incorporated into alternatives.  
Therefore, when an individual decides to take more risk they are increasing the variance 
of the payments they could possibly receive.   
The other dependent variable is the change in reference level.  A participant‟s 
reference level is assessed by their answer to the following question, “At what level of 
payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?” (Arkes, Hirshleifer, 
Jiang, and Lim 2010).  This variable is measured as the difference between a baseline 
reference level and the reference level at the end of the experiment.  
1.3 Results and Contribution 
The results of the study provide evidence that individuals under easy budget 
targets make more risky decisions than individuals under moderate budget targets.  This 
suggests that firms wanting their employees to make risky decisions should utilize easy 
budget targets.  The results also suggest that individuals‟ reference levels change over 
time and the magnitude of the change in reference level is dependent upon the number of 
times the budget target was attained.  Specifically, there is a positive relationship between 
the number of times the budget target was attained and change in reference level.  This 
suggests that individuals who continually attain the budget target have greater 
expectations of future economic outcomes than those who miss the budget target at least 
once.  Lastly, this study does not provide evidence that changes in reference level impact 
subsequent decision making.  Most theories relating to risky decision making, such as 
security-potential/aspiration level theory and prospect theory, propose that reference 
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levels play a vital role in decisions that are made.  This study does not find evidence to 
support this prediction.
6
   
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature.  I provide 
further evidence of the applicability of a decision making theory, security-
potential/aspiration level theory, in an accounting context.  This analysis contributes to 
decision making literature and compensation literature.  I also apply expectations-based 
reference-dependent preferences theory in an accounting context and provide evidence 
that expectations of future economic outcomes impact the formulation of individuals‟ 
reference levels.  This finding contributes to decision making literature and reference 
level literature. 
I also provide empirical evidence that reference levels change over time.  Prior 
decision making theories suggest that reference levels change over time but there is a 
paucity of empirical evidence documenting this change.  Additionally, this study 
contributes to reference level literature by demonstrating that continual attainment of a 
budget target increases individuals‟ reference levels. 
This study also makes a number of contributions to practice as well.  Prior 
research examining the effect of budget target difficulty has not provided a definitive 
conclusion of the behavioral impact of budget target level on employee risk-taking 
behavior.  This study provides additional empirical evidence that easy budget targets lead 
to more risk-taking behavior than moderate budget targets, which are the preferred 
budget target difficulty level in practice (Merchant and Manzoni 1989).  Therefore, firms 
                                                          
6
 Possible explanations why this result was not found are presented in the conclusions section of the study. 
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wanting their employees to make more risky decisions should implement easy budget 
targets rather than moderate budget targets. 
Lastly, the results suggest that individuals‟ reference levels change over time.  
Organizations should be aware of employees‟ changes in reference level because changes 
in reference level can impact the effectiveness of incentive contracts.  Therefore, 
organizations should be very diligent in analyzing the behaviors that incentive contracts 
elicit and be aware that changes in employees‟ reference levels could be a main factor if 
employee behaviors are not in line with management‟s goals. 
The remainder of the proposal is presented in sections.  The next section presents 
the literature review and hypothesis development.  The third section presents the method 
and experimental procedures.  The fourth section presents the results of the experiment 
and supplemental analysis.  The last section contains the conclusions.   
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Budgets 
Budgets permeate many aspects of an organization.  They affect how decision 
rights are allocated and are also used to motivate, evaluate, and reward performance 
(Baiman and Demski 1980; Baiman 1990; Luft and Shields 2003; Sprinkle et al. 2008).  
Budgets can also be incorporated into budget-based performance contracts, in which 
budgeted performance targets are embedded in compensation contracts.  From a directing 
and informational perspective, budget-based contracts are very effective at focusing 
employees‟ attention to the specific goals embedded within the contract (Fisher et al. 
2008).  Budget-based contracts can also be used to create goal congruence (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992; Sprinkle 2003).  Specifically, the use of budget-based contracts can align 
the goals of the firm with the goals of employees by incentivizing activities that benefit 
the firm (Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  In some cases, budget-based contracts can be used 
to incentivize employees to take a certain action, such as selecting between risky 
alternatives.   
An empirical question for which there is mixed evidence in the literature relates to 
how budget targets affect risky decision making and whether individuals‟ reference levels 
for evaluating and selecting risky projects change over time or remain constant.  The 
following sections describe the academic literature related to how budget targets should 
be set in order to create goal congruence between the firm and its employees, describes 
10 
 
theories related to risky decision making, and provides a description of how reference 
levels may be determined and may change over time.     
2.2 Budget-Targets and Goal Setting 
2.2.1 Goal Setting 
Goal setting theory and goal setting literature suggest that firms should set 
difficult but attainable performance targets.  This literature is replete with empirical 
evidence that performance increases with target difficulty and that goals improve 
performance (e.g., Mento et al. 1987; Locke and Latham 1990, 2002; Jeffrey et al. 2010).  
According to goal theory, more difficult goals improve performance by motivating 
greater effort and persistence at a task (Locke and Latham 1990).  The empirical evidence 
supporting the positive association between goal difficulty and performance generally 
relates to effort intensive tasks.  In these types of tasks, the positive relationship between 
goal difficulty and performance persists until the goal becomes too difficult and 
individuals do not have the ability to reach it and “give up” (Locke and Latham 1990, 
2002; Sprinkle et al. 2008).  In general, there is consensus that goal difficulty increases 
performance relating to effort intensive tasks because the link between effort and outcome 
is clear. 
An area that has received less attention is how goals affect decisions under risk 
(Valence 2001; Jeffrey et al. 2010).  Many managerial tasks are not necessarily effort 
intensive, but rather are based on achieving some goal of expected profit or return on 
investment, compared to achieving an effort intensive production goal (Ruchala 1999).  
Most existing research examining risk taking and goal attainment suggests that pursuing a 
goal increases risk taking (e.g., Mao 1970, Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum 1980, 1981; 
11 
 
Larrick, Heath, and Wu 2009).  For example, field studies suggest that managers are 
more willing to take on risks in order to reach a goal (Mao 1970; March and Shapira 
1987, 1992) either because the goal has a specific financial reward related to the 
achievement of the goal or because goals create internal motivation to achieve the goal.  
Research also suggests that individuals are more willing to take on risks to reach 
hypothetical job-related goals (Payne et al. 1981), to reach a real monetary goal (Larrick 
et al. 2009), and are more willing to cheat in order to reach a goal (Schweitzer, Ordonez, 
and Douma 2004).  Although this evidence suggests that difficult performance targets 
increase individuals‟ willingness to take on risks in order to achieve the goal, there is also 
evidence that this is not always the case (e.g., Bavelas and Lee 1978; Rothkopf and 
Billington 1979; Polzer and Neale 1995; Sprinkle et al. 2008; Ordonez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, and Bazerman 2009). 
Although most do not question the effectiveness of goals, some researchers have 
been concerned with isolating boundary conditions and unintended consequences of goal 
setting (Ordonez et al. 2009).  For example, Ordonez et al. (2009) suggest that stretch 
goals can have serious side effects, such as shifting risk attitudes, promoting unethical 
behavior, and triggering the psychological costs of goal failure.  In addition, prior 
research has demonstrated that difficult goals can harm performance on complex tasks 
and can detract from performance on tasks or task dimensions for which goals are not set 
(Bavelas and Lee 1978; Rothkopf and Billington 1979; Polzer and Neale 1995).  
Therefore, there is evidence suggesting that difficult performance targets are not always 
optimal in all settings. 
12 
 
There is some research that questions the validity of the assumption that difficult 
goals increase risk taking.  Merchant and Manzoni (1989) surveyed fifty-four profit 
centers and found that budget targets in the field are not generally set to be difficult.  
They report that budget targets were set to be achievable for most years included in the 
study in order to reduce the risk of managers giving up on the goal and to also make 
managers who achieved the goal feel like “winners” (Merchant and Manzoni 1989).  
There is also empirical evidence that “moderately” difficult goals or targets enhance 
overall firm performance while “over-ambitious” or difficult targets induce inferior 
incentives on productivity (Van der Stede 2000; Fisher, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2003).  
Additionally, Hirst (1987) suggests that task uncertainty may moderate the association 
between goal difficulty and performance.   
Other research has demonstrated potential downside effects of difficult 
performance targets or settings where difficult performance targets are not optimal.  
Schweitzer et al. (2004) found that participants were more likely to cheat in an 
experimental setting in order to reach a goal when they had a high performance target.  In 
an analytical investigation, Kuang and Suijs (2009) suggest that managers compensated 
with a cash bonus plan should have performance targets that are below the level that 
would maximize their effort because this decreases the compensation risk placed on the 
employee while not having a significant impact on the amount of effort exerted.  In other 
words, the authors suggest that modest or easy performance targets are optimal in this 
setting.  The conclusions of Kuang and Suijs (2009) are consistent with the argument for 
setting performance targets that are easily achievable (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Hirst 
and Lowry 1990; Fisher et al. 2003). 
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Based on extant research, therefore, it is uncertain whether more difficult 
performance targets lead to more risk taking or less risk taking and in what situations 
more difficult performance targets may lead to poor results.  The empirical evidence 
appears to provide mixed results, and therefore the impact of goals on risk taking 
warrants further investigation.   
2.2.2 Budget Targets 
Budgets are used in virtually all organizations (Murphy 2001; Fisher et al. 2008).   
In addition to budgets, budget-based contracts are also used extensively in practice and 
come in a variety of forms (Murphy 2001; Sprinkle and Williamson 2004; Chow et al. 
2007; Fisher et al. 2008).  Bonner et al. (2000) conclude from their review of eighty-five 
studies in various fields that budget-based incentive schemes are the most likely to 
produce positive effects, such as increased productivity and effort, which foster goal 
congruence.
7
   
There are a number of studies that are of particular importance to this study.  
Ruchala (1999) examined whether budget goal attainment and different types of incentive 
compensation affected individuals‟ selection and continuance of risky investment 
projects.
8
  Ruchala (1999) designed her experiment to mimic an investment portfolio 
choice.  After the first project selection, participants were informed whether or not they 
were ahead or behind their budget goal and were also told that their selections in the 
subsequent periods would affect whether or not they would achieve their budget goal.  
Therefore, the experiment is essentially a single period analysis containing multiple 
                                                          
7
 Bonner et al. (2000) use the term quota scheme, but the criteria (Bonner et al. 2000, 26) corresponds to 
budget-based contracts which use a form of quota (budget-target). 
8
 The budget goal in Ruchala (1999) was 20%.  Participants were informed after the initial selection 
whether their return was 18% or 22% and that their subsequent decisions could affect final goal attainment. 
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selections of risky projects because the final goal attainment (failure to attain) occurred 
only once.  The results suggest that individuals who were told they were behind their 
budget goal after their first decision in the experiment made riskier investment decisions 
in subsequent periods than participants who were told they were ahead of their budget 
goal.  The results tend to support prospect theory predictions that individuals in a loss 
frame (told they are behind the budget goal) will exhibit more risk-seeking behavior 
while individuals in a gain frame (told they are ahead of the budget goal) will exhibit 
more risk-averse behavior.   
The analysis of the change in risky decision making, however, was not based on 
the same task, but rather was based on participant‟s responses to an investment ranking 
task (Ruchala 1999).  Therefore, Ruchala (1999) did not investigate what drove this 
change, i.e., whether it was a change in risk attitude or a change in individuals‟ reference 
levels. In relation to incentive contract type, Ruchala (1999) demonstrates that a bonus-
based contract, in which monetary rewards are not paid unless the budget goal is attained, 
lead to significantly riskier decisions when combined with not achieving the budget 
goal.
9
  The main implication from Ruchala (1999) is that budget goal attainment has a 
significant effect on participants‟ subsequent risky investment decisions; failure to 
achieve the budget target promotes risk-seeking behavior. 
Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) reexamine how prior outcomes and incentive 
schemes influence how individuals frame current decisions and influence individuals‟ 
risk behavior.  They examine how individuals react when they are told they are behind or 
                                                          
9
 Ruchala (1999) compared bonus-based contracts to profit sharing contracts.  Under profit sharing 
contracts, participants receive a monetary share of the profit regardless of budget goal attainment.  There 
was no hypothesis for a main effect of incentive compensation and when a main effect variable for 
compensation was included in the model the results were insignificant. 
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ahead of some reference level.
 
 Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) do not, however, examine 
how individuals‟ reference levels change over time, which is the focus of the current 
study.  In an experiment analyzing risky investment decisions, they find support for 
Ruchala‟s (1999) results by demonstrating that individuals who are given a negative 
performance report, which is equivalent to failing to reach a budget target, are motivated 
to engage in more risk-seeking behavior than individuals who are given a positive 
performance report.  Taken together, Ruchala (1999) and Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) 
illustrate that prior outcomes can influence subsequent risk-taking behavior under budget-
based contracts.  
Recent research in accounting has examined how the level of budget-targets 
affects propensity to take risks.  In two closely related articles, Chow et al. (2007) and 
Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined this issue.  Chow et al. (2007) investigated a single 
period product selection setting, in which individuals were told to select one out of seven 
products to manufacture and sell.  Each product had a unique distribution relating to the 
return the product would generate.  Participants were also presented with either an easy 
performance target (budget-target) of 5 percent or a difficult performance target of 25 
percent.  The budget targets were based on the product return.  For example, the easy 
budget target was set to a 5 percent return on the product selected.  Participants then 
made their selection of which product to produce and sell.  The results from the 
experiment support prospect theory‟s prediction that difficult budget targets lead to more 
risk taking by individuals.  This finding suggests that firms wanting their employees to 
take more risks should implement difficult budget targets in order to create goal 
congruence. 
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Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined how the level of a budget target affects 
individuals‟ propensity to take risks in a single period setting.  Sprinkle et al. (2008) also 
incorporated an effort element in their experiment to investigate the trade-off between 
effort and risk taking.  In their experiment, individuals were presented with a matrix 
containing twelve projects.  Participants were presented with four pieces of information: 
(1) probability of meeting the budget, (2) amount paid if the budget is not met, (3) lowest 
amount paid if the budget is met, and (4) the highest amount paid if the budget is met.  
Unlike Chow et al. (2007), the experimental design incorporated a costly effort 
component.  The results pertaining to risky decisions from Sprinkle et al. (2008) suggest 
that individuals‟ propensity to take risks increases when they are compensated based on 
easier budget targets compared to more difficult budget targets.  These results are 
contradictory to Chow et al. (2007) and suggest that easy budget targets, rather than more 
difficult budget targets, would be beneficial for firms wanting their employees to take 
greater risks in their decision making.  The authors apply security-potential/aspiration 
theory rather than prospect theory to explain their results.
10
 
It is interesting that the two studies addressing virtually the same research 
question generated results that suggest two opposing prescriptions for creating goal 
congruency through the use of budget targets and apply two distinct decision theories to 
explain the results.  Chow et al. (2007) suggest that difficult budget targets lead to a 
higher propensity for risk taking while Sprinkle et al. (2008) suggest that easy budget 
targets lead to a higher propensity for risk taking.  There are a number of possibilities for 
why the results were so different.  First, Chow et al. (2007) used actual budget targets, 
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 A detailed discussion of Sprinkle et al. (2008) and the application of security-potential/aspiration theory 
is presented in a subsequent section. 
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which were communicated to the experimental participants, whereas Sprinkle et al. 
(2008) did not explicitly state what the budget targets were, but rather incorporated the 
budget targets into the information presented to participants in the decision matrix.  The 
decision matrix used in Sprinkle et al. (2008) presented participants with four pieces of 
information relating to each of the twelve projects from which the participants selected: 
probability of meeting the budget, amount paid if the budget is not met, lowest amount 
paid if the budget is met, and highest amount paid if the budget is met.  Therefore, 
Sprinkle et al. (2008) did not explicitly state the parameters of the budget targets but 
rather incorporated the easy and more difficult budget targets into these four pieces of 
information. 
Second, the difficulty of the budget targets could be different between the two 
studies.  In Chow et al. (2007), the budget targets were based on an expected level of 
return and were set at 5 percent (easy) and 25 percent (difficult).  In this case, the 25 
percent budget target may have been perceived as extremely difficult to achieve, thus 
forcing participants to engage in risk-taking behavior in order to possibly achieve the 
budget target.  Sprinkle et al. (2008) did not explicitly mention what the budget targets 
were but did mention that “difficult” targets would not produce the same study results as 
they found.  In other words, it can be presumed that Sprinkle et al. (2008) designed their 
experiment to incorporate “moderately” difficult budget targets.   
Another possible reason for the difference in results is that Sprinkle et al. (2008) 
incorporated a costly effort component in order to analyze the trade-off between risk and 
effort.  There were no costs of effort in Chow et al. (2007).  Generally employees who 
make investment/project decisions do not exert the physical effort to impact the outcome.  
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They generally serve in a management capacity, delegating responsibility and making 
decisions on courses of action (Ruchala 1999).  Therefore, their main focus is on the 
decision, weighting the cost/benefit of the alternatives.  They would not consider the cost 
of effort exerted by others to implement or execute the decision.  It is possible that the 
incorporation of the cost of effort lead to different empirical results. 
The products presented in Chow et al. (2007) followed much of prior research by 
holding the expected value of all possible alternatives constant.  By holding expected 
value constant, the outcome variance of the projects is manipulated, thus simulating 
different levels of risk.  This method is beneficial to isolate how risk affects individual‟s 
decision making.  Sprinkle et al. (2008) presented alternatives that had different expected 
values, different variances, and different levels of downside risk.  Sprinkle et al. (2008) 
incorporated these factors into their experimental design.  This study will follow Chow et 
al. (2007) and most extant research and hold expected value of the alternatives constant 
while incorporating many of the design aspects of Sprinkle et al. (2010).   
Lastly, none of the project selections available for selection in Chow et al. (2007) 
guaranteed the achievement of the budget target.  As will be discussed in detail later, 
security-potential/aspiration theory is dependent upon the achievement of an individual‟s 
aspiration level.  If the achievement of an aspiration level is not possible, then individuals 
are predicted to behave in accordance with prospect theory.  Therefore, the results of 
Chow et al. (2007) could be supported by both prospect theory and security-
potential/aspiration theory.  This study will analyze whether including alternatives that 
allow for the attainment of the aspiration level affects risk-taking behaviors. 
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2.3 Security-Potential/Aspiration Theory 
Security-potential/aspiration (SP|A) theory is a descriptive theory of decision-
making under risk, which attempts to account for how individuals approach decisions 
under risk (Lopes 1987).  SP|A theory contains many of the same elements as prospect 
theory.  For example, SP|A assumes that most individuals are loss-averse and also utilizes 
the concept of a reference level.  In SP|A, however, the reference level is referred to as an 
aspiration level (Lopes 1987, 1990).  An aspiration level is an outcome that takes a 
special position in the decision process (Diecidue and van de Ven 2008).     
Aspiration levels can take many forms.  They can be determined by exogenous 
factors, such as contract parameters or budget targets, or can be determined by 
endogenous factors, such as expectations and knowledge of prior outcomes, or a 
combination of the two (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Koszegi and Rabin 2006).  
Regardless of how an aspiration level is developed, individuals generally code outcomes 
below the aspiration level as failures and outcomes above the aspiration level as 
successes.  The aspiration level provides a clear delineation between success and failure.  
Individuals place value on the overall probability of success and the overall probability of 
failure.  Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals place a great deal of weight 
on the overall probability of success and concludes that this focus on the overall 
probability of success is in contrast with expected utility and with prospect theory (Payne 
2005).  Prior research also suggests decision making models should incorporate overall 
probability of success and failure into the models due to the importance individuals place 
on it (Payne 2005).   
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The focus on the overall probability of success relative to an aspiration level can 
also be seen in interviews and field studies of managers.  For instance, the response of 
one manager in a field study clearly states that an aspiration level plays a vital role in 
decision making when he says that “risk is the prospect of not meeting the target of 
return,” (Mao 1970, p. 353).  In the same study another manager states that “I never 
worry about the project going above the return.  Risk is what might happen when the 
return is going to be less,” (Mao 1970, p. 354).  Both of these statements suggest that an 
aspiration level, in this case a target rate of return, is a central focus in decision making.  
Additionally, subsequent research also suggests that a manager‟s primary focus is placed 
on avoiding actions that could potentially place one below some aspiration level (Lopes 
1987).  In other words, managers focus their attention on actions that put them in danger 
of falling below an aspiration level which subsequently makes the opportunities for gains 
less salient because the focus is on the danger of losses, not the opportunities for gains.
11
 
The focus on the overall probability of success and failure is a central feature of 
SP|A theory and plays a vital role in how individuals select among risky alternatives.  
SP|A theory proposes that individuals evaluate alternatives in two stages when making 
decisions in uncertain environments (Lopes 1987; Sprinkle et al. 2008).  In the first stage, 
individuals evaluate possible alternatives by assessing the probability of meeting a 
minimum aspiration level.  The aspiration level could be some exogenous factor, such as 
a budget target, or could be based on endogenous factors, such as an individual‟s 
expectations, or a combination of the two.  Regardless of how the aspiration level is 
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 Petty and Scott (1984) found this idea of a target return among most managers in a more extensive study. 
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developed, the aspiration level has special significance for individuals in the decision 
process.   
In the first stage of SP|A theory, individuals focus their attention on alternatives 
that meet the aspiration level with certainty (Lopes 1987).  Therefore, individuals focus 
on the alternatives that allow them to meet the aspiration level with certainty and reject 
all potential alternatives that do not guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level.  By 
focusing on projects that guarantee the achievement of the aspiration level individuals are 
able to remove projects that do not guarantee the aspiration level from consideration in 
the decision process.  This evaluation illustrates the importance of the probability of 
success.  If the probability of successfully achieving the aspiration level is in jeopardy for 
a particular alternative, then individuals will reject that alternative, thus removing it from 
consideration in their decision-making process (Lopes 1987; Lopes and Oden 1999).   
SP|A theory suggests that individuals in the first stage of decision making act in a 
risk-averse manner, rejecting alternatives that place them in danger of missing the 
minimum aspiration level.  Individuals will reject high-risk alternatives even if they 
contain the highest possible payout or have very high expected values (Lopes 1987; 
Sprinkle et al. 2008).  Therefore, the focus on the worst possible outcomes may lead 
individuals to disregard the “best” possible alternatives, based on probabilities, if there is 
even a small chance that this alternative will leave them short of their aspiration level.  At 
the end of the first stage of the decision process SP|A proposes that individuals have 
eliminated projects that do not allow them to meet their aspiration level with certainty.   
In the second stage of SP|A theory, the focus switches to potential payoffs.  
Specifically, if multiple alternatives meet the aspiration level with certainty, then 
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individuals will behave in a more risk-seeking manner.  Therefore, of the remaining 
alternatives that passed the first stage, individuals will focus now on alternatives that 
have the highest possible payoffs.
12
  Once an individual‟s aspiration level can be met 
with certainty (by meeting the first stage criterion) and all of the remaining alternatives 
place an individual above the aspiration level, the focus turns to the alternatives with the 
highest possible payout.  Of the alternatives remaining, those with the highest potential 
payout are generally the alternatives with higher variances (risk), and these alternatives 
receive more focus in the decision making process, leading to more risk-seeking 
behavior.
13
 
 
 Focus Risk Behavior 
First-Stage 
Eliminating projects that 
place the aspiration level in 
jeopardy 
Risk-averse – decrease the risk 
of failing to attain the aspiration 
level 
Second-Stage 
Selecting the project with the 
highest possible payoff 
Risk-seeking – select alternative 
with highest potential payout 
FIGURE 1. Two-Stage Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory 
  
The development of SP|A theory is based on empirical evidence demonstrating 
the importance of individuals‟ aspiration levels.  Early research suggested that 
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 Highest potential payoff refers to the highest amount of payment possible from the alternative.  This does 
not imply that individuals will select the most risky project.  This implies that individuals will become more 
risk-seeking. 
13
 When alternatives meet the aspiration level with certainty, individuals will act in a risk-seeking manner 
selecting projects that at least allow them the chance to achieve their aspiration level (Lopes 1987).  
Therefore, when no alternative guarantees the aspiration level with certainty, individuals will behave in 
accordance with prospect theory predictions. 
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individual‟s aspiration levels play an important role in effort-related tasks (Stedry 1960).  
Subsequent research in a variety of domains led to the proposal of SP|A theory.     
Schneider and Lopes (1986) analyzed whether individuals exhibited preference 
reversals predicted by prospect theory.  The results relating to the gain domain generally 
supported prospect theory; individuals tended to act in a risk-averse manner.  This result, 
while not overly supportive of SP|A, does not rule out SP|A as a descriptive theory of 
decision making.  Specifically, the risk-averse behavior may have been due to a lack of 
alternatives that satisfied the first stage of SP|A.  In the first stage of SP|A individuals 
eliminate alternatives from consideration that place the aspiration level in jeopardy.  If 
there are no alternatives that guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level, then 
individuals tend to act in a risk-seeking manner, selecting alternatives that at least give 
them a chance to attain their aspiration level.  This could explain individuals‟ behaviors 
in the gain domain.  Schneider and Lopes (1986) did show, however, that in the loss 
domain, the possibility of losing at least some amount posed a serious threat to the 
participant‟s sense of safety (aspiration level).  The results exhibited a mixed pattern of 
preferences which suggested that participants appeared to dislike lotteries at both 
extremes.  It appears they disliked the safest option because it would not allow them to 
meet their aspiration level and disliked the riskiest option presumably because the threat 
to their security is too high and individuals wanted to minimize the chance of the worst 
loss (Schneider and Lopes 1986).  These results are contrary to prospect theory, which 
would suggest that individuals would be risk-seeking in the loss domain.   
More recent research has provided more concrete evidence in support of SP|A 
theory.  Lopes and Oden (1999) analyzed whether the selection of different lotteries was 
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better explained by prospect theory or SP|A theory.
14
  In their experiment they performed 
a number of manipulations that shifted, scaled, or moved lotteries around a reference 
level.  Prospect theory would predict that as long as the outcomes did not cross the 
reference level, individuals‟ behavior should not change based on scaling or shifting 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), whereas SP|A theory would suggest that scaling or 
multiplying would affect the evaluation of alternatives because individuals‟ aspiration 
levels should change.  The results tended to support SP|A theory.  Particularly, the data 
showed that when individuals‟ aspiration levels were fully satisfied and not in jeopardy 
(stage 1) individuals tended to make riskier decisions and selected lotteries with higher 
predicted outcomes (stage 2).   
Lopes and Oden (1999), however, did not analyze how reference levels changed 
over time, which is the focus of this study.  Additionally, Lopes and Oden (1999) did not 
use financial incentives in their study.  Research has shown that financial incentives lead 
to more motivation and higher levels of effort (e.g., Vroom 1964, Bonner 2008).  
Therefore, the outcomes of individuals‟ decisions may differ in the presence of financial 
incentives, which is more indicative of a real world setting.  Specifically, firms have 
increased their use of monetary incentives in recent years, particularly for upper-level 
managers (Wall Street Journal 1999; Bonner 2008).  Therefore, the current study is 
different than Lopes and Oden (1999) due to the longitudinal experiment and the 
inclusion of financial incentives. 
The results of Lopes and Oden (1999) are also supported by additional research.  
Research examining task types showed that when individuals have multiple alternatives 
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 Lopes and Oden (1999) presented participants with alternatives that were not tied to financial incentives.  
The alternatives presented hypothetical outcomes. 
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that satisfy the aspiration level with certainty (stage 1) individuals are more willing to 
take additional risks in their decision process (stage 2) (Mukherjee 2010).  In other 
words, the two stage process proposed by SP|A theory is empirically supported by 
demonstrating that individuals in more complex, engaging tasks showed riskier behavior 
when all of the possible outcomes were positive.  The results from this study again refute 
the prospect theory prediction that individuals in the gain domain will exhibit risk-averse 
behavior. 
Despite the evidence providing support for SP|A theory, an important question is 
how SP|A theory relates to accounting.  The relation between accounting and SP|A theory 
lies in the aspiration level.  Prior research in accounting has suggested that management 
accounting practices can have an important influence on an individual‟s aspiration levels, 
which will therefore presumably affect performance (Birnberg et al. 2007).  A 
management accounting example would be whether individuals internalize budget targets 
and regard achieving the budget target as a matter of success or failure.  In effect, budget 
targets can serve as an individual‟s aspiration level.  Prior research suggests that an 
important question is how budgeting can directly influence levels of aspiration (Birnberg 
et al. 2007).    
In contrast to all of the research conducted applying prospect theory (e.g., 
Ruchala 1999; Chow et al. 2007; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010) there is only one study in 
accounting that analyzes the applicability or implications of SP|A theory in a budgeting 
context (Sprinkle et al. 2008).  Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyze the trade-off between effort 
and risk taking in the presence of budget-based targets.  Specifically, they analyzed how 
budget targets, easy or more difficult, as well as costs of effort, affect individuals‟ 
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propensity to take risks in a single period investment decision setting.  Their application 
of SP|A theory suggests that individuals with easy budget targets will be more risk-
seeking than individuals with more difficult budget targets.  Specifically they suggest that 
easy budget targets will increase the likelihood that more projects will meet the aspiration 
level with certainty (stage 1) and will therefore lead to more risk-seeking behavior 
because the probability of missing the aspiration level is eliminated (stage 2).  Under a 
more difficult budget target, however, individuals will strive to achieve the aspiration 
level, which will more than likely eliminate many risky projects that jeopardize the 
aspiration level (stage 1) and the selection of projects that meet the aspiration level will 
only contain less risky options (stage 2).
15
  Therefore, the focus on the achievement of the 
aspiration level leads to more risk-seeking for easy budget targets and more risk-averse 
behavior for more difficult budget targets.  Their results support these predictions and 
thereby support SP|A theory. 
Although Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyzed the applicability of SP|A theory in an 
accounting context, they did not examine how individuals‟ reference levels would affect 
subsequent risky decision making and this limitation was noted by the authors.  
Therefore, this study will examine how changes in individuals‟ reference levels affects 
subsequent risky decision making behavior.  It could be that over time individuals 
reference levels change, which would affect subsequent decision making.  A multi-period 
examination will provide further evidence.  
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 This statement assumes that there are projects that will guarantee the attainment of the budget target 
under a moderately difficult budget target.  In scenarios where this is not the case, individuals will be 
forced to be risk-seeking in order to increase their probability of attaining the budget target, as is the case 
with difficult but attainable budget targets. 
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2.4 Reference Levels 
Although there is empirical evidence supporting both prospect theory and SP|A 
theory, there is a limitation that applies to both theories.  This limitation, noted by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and other researchers (e.g. Koszegi and Rabin 2006; 
Wakker 2010) relates to the psychological feature of reference dependence.  Prospect 
theory suggests that individuals judge outcomes relative to some comparison point, which 
divides possible outcomes into regions of gain and loss.  In prospect theory, this 
comparison point is known as the reference point.  When prospect theory was first 
developed, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognized that an individual‟s reference point 
may shift due to one‟s expectations or aspiration level (p. 286).  SP|A theory suggests that 
alternatives are evaluated based on whether or not they meet the aspiration level, which 
also makes SP|A theory a reference-dependent theory.
16
   
Most of the research related to prospect theory and to SP|A theory, however, 
generally assumes that individuals‟ reference levels have already been determined and 
are fixed (Wakker 2010).  This assumption may be especially true in single-period 
settings, yet Tversky and Kahneman (1992) recognized that reference levels may shift 
due to prior experiences, which suggests that over multiple periods individuals‟ reference 
level may not remain fixed.  Therefore the assumption of a fixed and predetermined 
reference level does not allow for the fact that individuals‟ reference levels may shift over 
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 Reference level, as used in this study, incorporates both reference points (prospect theory) and aspiration 
levels (security-potential/aspiration level theory). 
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time, thus leading to possible changes in risk behavior that have not been accounted for in 
prior accounting literature.
17
    
The reliance on the assumption of a fixed and predetermined reference level also 
revolved around the lack of theory positing how individuals‟ reference levels were 
determined.  Without a testable theory describing how to identify the reference level the 
assumption of the reference level as the status quo was adequate.  Early theories of 
decision making pointed out that there was no theory for the location of reference levels 
and considered this to be a weak point of decision theory (Markowitz 1952). 
At prospect theory‟s conception, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that an 
individual‟s reference level could be related to a number of external or internal factors.  
These factors include an individual‟s expectations, aspiration level, exogenously set 
contract parameters, prior outcomes, etc. (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler and 
Johnson 1990).  Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a theory of reference-
dependence for consumer behavior that attempts to explain how an individual‟s 
preferences would change when their reference levels change, but did not identify how a 
reference level is determined.
18
 The evolution of prospect theory has led academics to 
develop a theory relating to how reference levels are determined.  This development now 
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 Although Ruchala (1999) and Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) examined prior outcomes and the effects on 
behavior, both studies were single period and prior outcomes were manipulated and not based on actual 
decisions made by individuals which removes some level of individual control from the experiments, 
especially in a multi-period experiment.  Additionally, neither study measured individuals‟ reference levels 
and cannot attribute the change in behavior to a change in reference level.  Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined 
a single period setting and whether SP|A theory could explain individual risk-taking behavior.  The current 
study extends this line of research by examining a multi-period setting where individuals make their own 
decisions and reference levels are recorded. 
18
 Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1991) reference-dependent theory was able to account for two well 
established violations of prospect theory, the status quo bias and the endowment effect. The status quo bias 
occurs when individual decision makers attach additional value to their default options or status quo choice 
(Ortoleva 2010).  The endowment effect refers to the fact that individuals demand much more to give up an 
object that they own than they are willing to spend in order to acquire the same object (Huck, Kirchsteiger, 
and Oechssler 2005)  
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allows researchers to examine how possible changes in reference levels can affect 
behaviors in a number of settings.  
Additionally, many researchers in economics are hesitant to apply prospect theory 
because they are forced to specify a reference level yet psychological principles about 
plausible reference levels provide little guidance (Hastie 2001).  Various authors have 
proposed that norms, expectations, levels of aspiration, foregone alternatives, and social 
comparisons can function as an individual‟s reference level (Luce, Mellers, and Change 
1993; Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999; Thaler 1999).    
Prior to the development of a testable theory, a number of studies began to 
analyze possible factors that could affect an individual‟s reference level.  McCusker and 
Carnevale (1995) investigated a resource allocation dilemma and found that expectations 
driven by a sanction system shifted reference levels, subsequently effecting individuals‟ 
contributions.
19
  These results suggest that exogenous factors, such as a sanction system, 
as well as expectations derived from exogenous factors, can influence reference levels.  
Carnevale (2008) and Seo, Goldfarb, and Barrett (2010) analyzed how affect could 
impact reference levels.  Both studies indicate that affect can influence the location of a 
reference level in evaluating prospective outcomes by altering individuals risk attitudes 
depending on their affective reactions to prior events.
20
    
Research in finance has analyzed reference levels for stocks and stock valuations.  
Shefrin and Statman (1985) illustrated that the purchase price of a security serves as a 
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 The sanction system provided rewards and penalties for individual‟s contributions to the dilemma, either 
a public goods dilemma or a common dilemma.  
20
 In general, Seo et al. (2010) find a moderating effect of affect on risk taking.  Specifically, when 
individuals have pleasant (unpleasant) affect in the gain domain they are more (less) likely to take on risk.  
Conversely, individuals in the loss domain are less (more) likely to be risk-seeking when they have pleasant 
(unpleasant) affect.  
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reference level for individuals.  This contention was supported by Odean (1998), who 
also suggested that an individual‟s reference price for securities can change over time, 
albeit sluggishly.  Gneezy (2005) extended this line of research by examining the most 
likely reference price individuals use in valuing stocks.  The experimental results suggest 
that individuals are most likely to use the historical peak price of the stock as a reference 
price. 
More recently, Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) and Baucells, Weber, and Welfens 
(2011) began answering questions about how reference prices for stocks changed based 
on whether stock prices increased or decreased.  Using questionnaire data and real 
monetary incentives, Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) noted that individuals integrated increases 
in stock price into their reference levels faster than they integrated decreases in the stock 
price.  Specifically, after participants viewed changes in stock prices, they incorporated 
gains into their reference levels more than losses, and this was especially true when 
individuals were forced to sell the stock and realize the gain or loss.   
Extending Arkes et al. (2008, 2010), Baucells et al. (2011) estimated a model for 
the formulation of reference levels relating to stock prices.  Their model incorporates a 
number of factors that they find influence individual‟s reference price: purchase price, 
most recent price, and the intermediate prices seen by individuals.  The purchase price 
and most recent price in their experiment and model development carried the most weight 
in the formulation of reference prices while intermediate weights (prices seen during the 
course of the experiment) received smaller weight.  Baucells et al. (2011) is an important 
development in reference level research, as it is the first article to develop an actual 
model representing how reference levels are developed.  Baucells et al. (2011) conclude 
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that the model developed is a reasonably good fit for the data and provides an avenue for 
future research to examine how reference levels are determined in domains other than 
stock valuations. 
Although research has examined reference levels in the stock price domain, there 
are a number of differences between a stock investment setting and a budget-based 
compensation setting.  In stock investment settings, individuals expect constant 
fluctuations in prices, and the results from that study may not generalize to an economic 
setting using budget targets and wages.  Another key difference between the two settings 
is controllability.  Individuals have more control over budget target attainment than they 
do over the stock price.  Although individuals are able to select stocks in which to invest, 
they have no control over whether the stock price will increase or decrease.  In an 
economic setting with budget targets and wages, individuals have control over which 
alternatives to select and the selection of alternatives has a direct effect on the attainment 
(failure to attain) of the budget target.  In addition, individuals do not „expect‟ to not 
attain their budget target, and therefore, the failure to attain the budget target may have 
more of an effect in this setting compared to a stock investment setting where there is an 
expectation that stock prices can fluctuate both up and down.   
Additionally, mental accounting theory suggests that individuals categorize gains 
and losses into various mental accounts (Thaler 1985, 1999).  Research has suggested 
that the mental accounts individuals use for investments is separate and distinct from the 
accounts used for income (Thaler 1999).  Specifically, prior research has demonstrated 
that investors leave their mental accounts open indefinitely when their investment has 
paper losses so that they can avoid the pain associated with a realized loss (Arkes et al. 
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2008, 2010; Fennema and Koonce 2011).  This finding suggests that in a stock 
investment setting, individuals have the ability to put off closing their mental account 
until gains and losses are actually realized.  In a budget-based compensation setting, 
however, individuals will realize their gain (attainment of budget target) or loss (failure to 
attain budget target) in the period of their investment decision.
21
  In other words, 
individuals do not have the option to leave their mental accounts open for an indefinite 
period of time to avoid the pain associated with realized losses like they would in a stock 
investment setting.   
Prior research in accounting has suggested that attaining or not attaining a budget 
target or performance goal can affect subsequent risk decisions (Ruchala 1999; Drake and 
Kohlmeyer 2010).  Both of these studies manipulated the attainment of the budget goal so 
that individuals‟ decisions did not dictate whether the budget goal was attained or not.  
One possibility not examined in prior research is that prior performance and 
concomitantly the success or failure of attaining the budget target can affect individuals‟ 
reference levels.  This study will extend this line of research by investigating not only 
how attaining (not attaining) a budget target affects future behavior but also how 
attaining (not attaining) the target is impounded into reference levels over multiple 
periods.   
                                                          
21
 The experimental setting provides feedback for economic outcomes each period.  Every investment 
decision lasts for one year (a single period) and then another investment decision is made in the following 
period, which lasts for one year. 
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2.4.1 Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences Theory 
One of the shortcomings of decision theory is the lack of a theory relating to how 
reference levels are determined.
22
  Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a reference 
dependent theory but address how individuals react to deviations from the reference 
level, not how reference levels are determined.  They treat the reference level as 
exogenously determined, which is adequate for explaining most experimental and survey 
data, but limits the applicability of the theory.  In an attempt at addressing this, Koszegi 
and Rabin (2006, 2007) developed expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, 
which is a reference dependent theory that extends prior work in prospect theory.
23
   
Reference-dependent preferences assumes that an individual‟s reference level is 
developed based on his or her rational expectations, rather than the status-quo.  This does 
not imply that the reference level is not determined, at least in part, by exogenous factors.  
On the contrary, if an individual has no prior rational expectations, then their reference 
level should be determined mostly on exogenous factors, such as a budget target.  An 
individual‟s rational expectations are based on beliefs and perceptions developed in the 
recent past about outcomes.  For instance, rational expectations for future periods could 
be based on economic outcomes received in a prior period, such as wages paid.  In other 
words, an individual‟s expectations are used to develop the reference level.  Reference-
dependent preferences specifies that an individual‟s reference level is determined 
endogenously by the economic environment.  Therefore, exogenous features, such as 
contract parameters, are internalized and used in conjunction with an individual‟s rational 
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 The lack of specification of how reference levels are developed applies to SP|A theory and aspiration 
levels as well as prospect theory and reference points. 
23
 For the remainder of the study, expectations-based reference-dependent preferences will be referred to 
only as reference-dependent preferences. 
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expectations to set the reference level (Koszegi and Rabin 2006).  It should be noted that 
reference-dependent preferences makes an extreme assumption that the reference level is 
fully determined by the expectations a person held in the recent past.    
The idea that expectations can determine the reference level is not new.  Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) stated that “a diversity of factors determine the reference outcome 
in everyday life.  The reference outcome is usually a state to which one has adapted; it is 
sometimes set by social norms and expectations; it sometimes corresponds to a level of 
aspiration, which may or may not be realistic,” (p. 456).  The importance of reference-
dependent preferences is the formalization of a model that describes general rules on how 
individuals set their reference levels in a number of settings.   
Reference-dependent preferences model has a number of appealing features.  
First, the model indicates that an individual‟s utility function has two components, 
standard consumption utility and gain-loss utility (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Parra 2010).  
Standard consumption utility relates to the prospect theory idea that utility is derived 
from current payments and current efforts.  This can be thought of as the material payoff 
(Daido and Itoh 2010).  The additional form of utility, gain-loss utility is derived from 
departures from a reference level.  To illustrate, consider the following example.  A 
worker is expecting to get paid $50,000 this year, which is based on his/her rational 
expectations from prior outcomes.  Instead of $50,000, the worker receives $40,000.
24
  In 
terms of standard consumption utility, the worker would evaluate utility based on the 
receipt of $40,000, in accordance with standard prospect theory.  Gain-loss utility, on the 
other hand, captures differences in an individual‟s expectations (reference level) and 
                                                          
24
 The reason for the decrease in salary is irrelevant for this example highlighting the difference between 
the two utility functions. 
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realized outcomes.  In this case, an individual would perceive the $40,000 as a $10,000 
loss based on the expectation of receiving $50,000. 
In addition to incorporating an additional form of utility, reference-dependent 
preferences also makes a number of assumptions.  Particularly, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) 
specify the notion of personal equilibrium, which assumes an individual correctly 
interprets the environment he/she is in and correctly predicts his/her own reaction to the 
environment given the reference level generated by his/her expectations.  Personal 
equilibrium means that individuals know their reference level, and given that reference 
level will select an option that is consistent with expectations.  Koszegi and Rabin (2006) 
extend upon the idea of personal equilibrium and introduce the concept of preferred 
personal equilibrium, which in essence requires the decision maker to select the personal 
equilibrium plan with the highest ex ante expected utility. 
The reference-dependent preferences model was developed and applied 
analytically to consumer behavior and labor market supply by Koszegi and Rabin (2006).  
In general, by specifying the determination of the reference level based on expectations, 
and not the status quo, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrate that there is a relationship 
between an individual‟s expectations of purchase (a reference level), price expectations (a 
reference level) and willingness to purchase (behavior).  Specifically, they analytically 
demonstrate that as an individual‟s expectation of purchase and price expectations 
conditional on purchase increase, so too does the willingness to pay for a good.  If an 
individual expects to purchase a good and has certain expectations of the price, these 
expectations influence an individual‟s willingness to purchase a good.   
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FIGURE 2. Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences Theory 
 
Applying the reference-dependent preferences model to a labor supply decision, 
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrate that expectations of earned income affect 
individuals‟ decisions to work.  They show that if income earned is unexpectedly high, a 
worker is less likely to continue to work because their expectations have already been 
met.  Specifically, they examine cab driver labor supply and apply reference-dependent 
preferences by inferring that cab drivers have endogenously set income targets.  For 
instance, a driver who averages $200 a day will have an endogenously set reference level 
close to $200.   Therefore, a driver with a $200 reference level who makes $1,000 in the 
morning will be less likely to continue working because their reference level has already 
been met.  Additionally, if expected income is high, for example $400, an individual is 
more likely to show up for work and continue to work, due to the expectation of high 
income for the day.   
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrated analytically the applicability of 
reference-dependent preferences.  Since its development, reference-dependent 
preferences has been analytically applied to a number of domains.  For instance, research 
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has examined price competition among firms with loss-averse consumers and assumes in 
these models that consumers are loss-averse relative to a reference level, which is 
determined based on consumers‟ recent expectations about purchases (Heidhues and 
Koszegi 2008).  More importantly for this study, reference-dependent preferences has 
been analytically modeled in a principal-agent, moral hazard context.  Daido and Itoh 
(2010) analyze the interaction between reference-dependent preferences and incentives 
with the main focus revolving around an agent‟s effort.  They show analytically that an 
agent‟s higher expectations allow the principal to use lower-powered incentives while 
still receiving high levels of effort from the agent.  An agent with high expectations about 
his/her performance can be induced to choose high levels of effort with low-powered 
incentives, which illustrates how expectations of performance can affect individuals‟ 
behaviors.   
One of the interesting contributions of Daido and Itoh (2010) is the proposition of 
how individual‟s reference levels are determined in a principal-agent context.  The 
authors propose that an agent‟s reference level is determined by his or her expectations 
about the effort level chosen and the resulting success probability of the project.  This 
specification focuses the analysis more on effort than monetary payoffs.   
In addition to analytical analysis, recent empirical work has demonstrated that 
expectations can and do serve some function in the development of reference levels.  
Smith (2008) examined experimentally whether individuals‟ expectations could explain 
the endowment effect and found that expectations can provide a rational explanation for 
the endowment effect.  Specifically, individuals who are told they “own” an object 
develop expectations of keeping the object.  The expectation of keeping the object 
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increases the value individuals place on the object, thus leading to a higher reference 
level than if the reference level was just the status quo.
25
  Ericson and Fuster (2011) 
expand on this line of research and show that increasing individuals‟ expectations of 
ownership affects exchange behavior and valuation.  The results support the assertion that 
expectations, at least in part, influence the determination of the reference level. 
Extending the empirical tests of reference-dependent preferences, Gill and Prowse 
(2010) conduct a sequential move tournament experiment and demonstrate that during 
competition (tournament incentive scheme) individuals have reference levels that are 
determined by their monetary payoffs and these reference levels are also affected by the 
choices and outcomes of other competitors.
26
  This evidence suggests that monetary 
payoffs may in fact be incorporated into individual‟s reference levels.  However, these 
results also suggest that the incorporation of monetary payoffs into reference levels may 
be contingent on competition.
27
     
There is additional empirical evidence that contract parameters may play a role in 
the determination of reference levels.  Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011) analyze 
individuals‟ effort levels based on two different forms of contracts.  The authors 
manipulated the amount of fixed wage being offered to participants and informed 
participants that there is a 50 percent probability they will receive the fixed wage or a 50 
percent probability they will receive a piece-rate wage that is determined by their output.  
Reference-dependent preferences would suggest that if expectations are influential in the 
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 In the current study, the status quo would be the base wage associated with not attaining the budget target 
in the initial period. 
26
 Gill and Prowse (2010) focus on disappointment aversion in a real effort tournament.  Focus on whether 
individuals who exert effort at a task for a prize reveal disappointment aversion in subsequent tasks. 
27
 This is based on social comparison theory (Festinger 1954).  Under social comparison theory, individuals 
compare their outcomes to other‟s outcomes.  Competition exacerbates this comparison.   
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determination of the reference level, individuals would stay closer to the fixed wage 
amount because they do not want to exert effort to earn the piece rate when there is a 50 
percent probability they will be paid a fixed wage.  The results of the experiment 
demonstrated that individuals in the two distinct fixed wage conditions remained close to 
the fixed wage amount, suggesting that expectations of future economic outcomes, either 
the receipt of the fixed wage or the receipt of the piece rate, influence the formulation of 
individuals‟ reference levels.     
The evidence presented above suggests that expectations play at least a part in the 
formulation of reference levels.  One of the open questions remaining in this literature 
stream is what constitutes recent expectations.  Daido and Itoh (2010) suggest that recent 
expectations relate to effort and the probability of success related to the outcome.  
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) suggest recent expectations relating to purchases.  This study 
will extend this literature by examining recent expectations relating to economic 
payments based on a budget-target compensation contract that incorporates a bonus for 
attaining the budget target.  Specifically, this study will analyze whether individuals‟ 
reference levels adjust over time based on prior performance relative to their assigned 
budget target (economic outcomes), which may impact the effectiveness of budget-based 
contracts.    
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3.0 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Single Period Risky Decision Making Behavior 
Despite all of the evidence supporting SP|A theory, there is only one study in 
accounting that analyzes the applicability of SP|A theory in a budgeting context.  
Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyze the trade-off between risk taking and effort in the presence 
of budget-based contracts in a single period investment decision setting.  Their 
application of SP|A suggests that individuals with easy budget targets will be more risk-
seeking than individuals with more difficult budget targets.  Specifically, they suggest 
that easy budget targets will increase the likelihood that more projects will meet the 
aspiration level with certainty (Stage 1 of SP|A theory) and will therefore lead to more 
risk-seeking behavior because the probability of missing the aspiration level is eliminated 
(Lopes and Oden 1999; Sprinkle et al. 2008).  Under easy budget targets there will be 
more projects that allow for the guaranteed attainment of the budget target, which implies 
that more projects will pass stage 1 of the decision making process.  This suggests that 
individuals place a great deal of weight on the overall probability of success, illustrated 
here by the guaranteed attainment of the aspiration level (Payne 2005).  Therefore, in 
stage 2, when individuals are suggested to behave in a more risk-seeking manner, there 
will be more projects from which a selection can be made and individuals will tend to 
select the alternative with the highest possible payoff.   
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Under a moderate budget target, individuals will also strive to attain their 
aspiration level, which will more than likely eliminate many risky projects that will 
jeopardize the attainment of the aspiration level (stage 1 of SP|A theory) and the selection 
of alternatives that meet the aspiration level will only contain less risky options (stage 2).  
Therefore, the focus on the achievement of the aspiration level leads to more risk-seeking 
behavior for easy budget targets compared to moderate budget targets.   
Sprinkle et al. (2008) incorporate a cost of effort component to analyze whether 
there is a trade-off between risky decision making and effort selection.  In the current 
study, the cost of effort is removed.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is necessary to 
test whether SP|A predictions are applicable to situations where the only consideration is 
risk and not the cost of effort.  Based on SP|A theory, the following hypothesis predicts 
that individuals under easy budget targets will exhibit more risk-seeking behavior 
because more projects will pass stage 1 of the decision making process, thus leaving 
more alternatives in stage 2 where individuals will switch their focus to alternatives with 
the highest possible outcomes.  Under moderate budget targets there will be fewer 
alternatives that pass stage 1, and the alternatives that do pass stage 1 will generally be 
the ones with smaller variances, and thus contain less risk, thus leading to more risk-
averse selections.
28
  Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H1: In an initial task undertaking, individuals with easy budget targets 
will exhibit more risk taking than individuals with moderate budget 
targets. 
                                                          
28
 This argument and the accompanying hypothesis is based purely on SP|A theoretical predictions.  In 
most situations, there will be few, if any projects that guarantee the attainment of a moderate or difficult 
budget target. 
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3.2 Changes in Reference Levels and Decision Making over Multiple Periods 
A significant caveat in the application of decision theory is the assumption that 
reference levels are constant and fixed (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Wakker 2010).  This 
assumption is not supported by theory, however, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
recognized that individuals‟ reference levels may shift over time due to expectations or 
aspiration levels.  The assumption of fixed and constant reference levels may hold true in 
single period settings where individuals make a single decision based on some reference 
level that is determined based on exogenous factors, whereby expectations of future 
performance are not yet formulated. 
In multiple periods, however, individuals tend to develop expectations of future 
outcomes.  Prior research has noted that expectations, such as expectations of purchase, 
expectations of daily income, consumers‟ recent expectations of purchases, employees‟ 
expectations of performance, expectations of ownership serve as important inputs to the 
formulation of individuals‟ reference levels (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Heidhues and 
Koszegi 2008; Smith 2008; Daido and Itoh 2010).  Therefore, reference-dependent 
preferences theory postulates that expectations play a vital role in the formulation of 
individuals‟ reference levels.   
One of the open questions remaining in this literature stream is what constitutes 
recent expectations.  Daido and Itoh (2010) suggest that recent expectations relate to 
effort and the probability of success related to the outcome.  Koszegi and Rabin (2006) 
suggest that recent expectations can relate to consumer expectations of purchases.  This 
study will extend this literature by examining recent expectations relating to economic 
payments based on a budget-based compensation contract that incorporates budget 
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targets.  Specifically, this study will analyze whether individuals‟ reference levels adjust 
over time based on prior performance relative to their assigned budget target (economic 
outcomes), which may impact the effectiveness of budget-based contracts.  
A key question relating to reference levels is how the reference level is 
determined in different contexts.  For example, in a budget target setting, an individual 
could rely on a number of outcomes or options in setting their reference level.  
Specifically, an individual, particularly in an initial task undertaking, could have a 
reference level that directly corresponds to the budget target level.
29
 In most budget-
based compensation contracts, financial incentives are tied to the budget target.  It is 
therefore likely that in a budget-based contract individuals will use the budget target as 
their reference level.  Indeed, prior research suggests that individuals use budget targets 
as their reference levels in initial task undertakings (Heath et al. 1999; Sprinkle et al. 
2008; Larrick et al. 2009).  This suggests the possibility that individuals may not adjust 
their reference levels but rather may adopt their budget target as their reference level and 
retain the budget target level as their status quo reference level. 
On the other hand, over time individuals also receive wages in the form of base 
salaries and possible bonuses relating to the attainment of budget targets.  Therefore, it is 
possible that individuals will begin to develop expectations of future payment that could 
affect their reference level.  Subsequently, individuals who continually achieve the 
budget target may adjust their reference level to incorporate their expectations of future 
payments based on recent prior outcomes.  Indeed, prior research suggests that prior 
outcomes have an effect on individuals‟ subsequent risk decisions, and the change in 
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 This would imply a reference level that is equal to the monetary amount for exactly meeting the budget 
target, which would be the annual base salary. 
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risky behavior may be due to changes in individuals‟ reference level (Ruchala 1999; 
Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010).  This research suggests it is plausible that individuals 
incorporate their expectations of future economic payments into their reference levels 
based on outcomes of prior periods. 
Based on the preceding discussion, reference-dependent preferences theory would 
suggest that individuals‟ reference levels are at least in part formulated based on 
endogenously created rational expectations.  In an economic setting, these rational 
expectations can be based on expectations of future economic outcomes, for instance 
compensation.  Therefore, the following hypotheses will examine whether individuals in 
an economic setting set their reference level based on expectations developed from recent 
prior experiences relating to their actual financial outcomes or whether they simply rely 
on a status quo reference level, which in this case should be the budget target.  If 
individuals adjust their reference levels over time in response to expectations of future 
economic outcomes based on prior experience, then individuals who attain their budget 
target and receive their base salary plus some amount of variable bonus payment would 
be expected to show the greatest reference level adjustment.  The probability of attaining 
the budget target is more likely under an easy budget target, yet individuals in the 
moderate budget condition can select projects that also allow guaranteed attainment of 
the budget target.  Therefore, hypothesis two predicts that individuals who continually 
attain the budget target will exhibit a greater shift in their reference level because they 
have received higher levels of payment and have a greater possibility of impounding their 
expectations of future economic outcomes into their reference levels.  To test whether 
individuals‟ reference levels change over time the following hypothesis is presented.  
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H2: The greater the frequency by which individuals attain the budget 
target, the greater the increase in their reference level. 
 
The above hypothesis is designed to test whether reference levels change 
over time.  It does not specify how changes in individuals‟ reference levels will 
change behavior.  If hypothesis two is not supported, that would suggest that 
individuals anchor on the designated budget target and expectations do not affect 
their reference level or risk taking decisions.  If, however, reference levels do 
change over time, this change allows for additional examination of how 
individuals adjust their behavior with respect to changes in their reference level.   
If individuals follow SP|A theory‟s predictions, then an upward shift in an 
individual‟s reference level will lead to more risk-averse behavior.  According to SP|A, 
when an aspiration level increases, the number of alternatives which ensure the aspiration 
level will be achieved will decrease, most likely eliminating more risky projects in the 
first stage of project evaluation.
30
  Individuals who continually attain the budget target are 
more likely to impound their expectations of future economic outcomes into their 
reference levels. Therefore, in the second stage of project evaluation individuals will have 
fewer risky options to select from, thus leading them to exhibit more risk-averse behavior 
than if their aspiration levels did not change.  In order to test this prediction based on 
SP|A, the following hypothesis is presented. 
H3:  With knowledge of prior economic outcomes, individuals who 
have continually attained the budget target will exhibit less risk 
taking in a task repetition than in an initial task undertaking. 
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 Recall, under SP|A individuals evaluate projects in two stages.  In the first stage the focus is on the 
attainment of the aspiration level.  In the second stage, the focus is on maximizing potential payoffs. 
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4.0 METHOD 
 
The experimental design is a 1 X 2 between-subjects design which incorporates 
five experimental periods.  The between-subjects variable, budget target is manipulated at 
two levels: easy and moderate.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
manipulated conditions.  All experimental sessions were conducted in a controlled 
laboratory setting.  The experimental task is a modification of Sprinkle et al. (2008). 
4.1 Experimental Participants 
Participants for this experiment were from a large southeastern United States 
university.  The participant pool was upper-level undergraduate accounting students.  
Due to the nature of the task, upper-level undergraduate accounting students were 
suitable participants.  Remus (1986) suggests that students are adequate proxies for 
managers in experiments involving decision-making tasks.  This finding is further 
supported by research that suggests that students are likely to be better surrogates for 
managers in experiments involving decision-making tasks than in experiments that 
examine attitudes and attitude changes (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Houghton and 
Hronsky 1993).  In addition, Trottier and Gordon (2011) suggest that the magnitude of 
the effect may differ between student proxies and managers but the inferences from the 
experimental results generally remain unchanged.  This suggests that differences between 
student proxies and managers may have differences in absolute magnitude but do not 
change the inferences from the study itself.   
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In addition, experience in selecting projects is consistent with individuals 
selecting from a series of lotteries.  In selecting projects to invest in or lotteries, 
individuals consider the downside risk, upside risk, and then make a selection (Shapira, 
1994).  Therefore, upper-level undergraduate accounting students were an appropriate 
participant pool for this experiment because experience in the task was not expected to 
interact with any variables of interest (Peecher and Solomon 2001). 
4.2 Experimental Variables 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variable in this study is budget target difficulty which was 
manipulated at two levels: easy and moderate.  Budget target difficulty was manipulated 
in two ways.  The first manipulation relates the amount of base salary that individuals 
receive in the budget target conditions.  In the easy budget target condition individuals 
receive a base salary of 15,000 Lira.  The base salary in the moderate budget target 
condition is 30,000 Lira.  The difference in base salary incorporates the notion of 
uncertainty in pay for the moderate budget target condition, thus leading to a higher base 
salary.  In the moderate budget condition there are fewer projects that allow guaranteed 
attainment of the budget target.  Therefore, the moderate budget target condition 
incorporates a higher base salary due to the greater uncertainty in pay, which is consistent 
with the compensation literature, which suggests that increases in the variability of 
compensation should be somewhat offset by increases in the base salary (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992).   
The main manipulation of budget target difficulty relates to the differences in the 
probability of attaining the budget target between the conditions.  In the easy budget 
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target condition five of the seven projects allow guaranteed attainment of the budget 
target.  Only the two riskiest projects do not allow guaranteed attainment of the budget 
target.  In the moderate budget target condition, on the other hand, only two of the seven 
projects allow guaranteed attainment of the budget target.  Only the two least risky 
projects allow for guaranteed attainment of the budget target.  Therefore, this 
manipulation incorporates the idea that when budget targets are not set to easily 
attainable levels, there will be fewer alternatives that allow guaranteed attainment of the 
budget target. 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
There are a number of dependent variables used to test the hypotheses.  The 
dependent variable for hypothesis one is based on the project that individuals select in the 
first period.  Each project presented has a variance, which represents the level of risk that 
a particular project has.  The use of variance as a proxy for project risk is analogous to 
prior research (Chow and Haddad 1991; Sayre, Rankin, and Fargher 1998; Chow et al. 
2007; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010) and is based on the vast literatures in finance dealing 
with decision making under risk and uncertainty.  The variance of each project, which is 
operationalized as the difference between the highest and lowest amounts paid if the 
budget is met, is impacted by a number of components.  The variance in the amount of 
payments that can be received from attaining the budget target are impacted by three 
components: (1) the amount of base salary an individual will receive if the budget target 
is missed, (2) the lowest amount paid if the budget target is met, and (3) the probability of 
attaining the budget target.   
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The amount of base salary is determined by the budget condition: 15,000 in the 
easy budget condition and 30,000 in the moderate budget target condition.  This amount 
remains consistent for all projects within a particular budget target condition.   The 
lowest amount paid if the budget target is met is consistent across conditions and 
decreases as the amount of risk in a project increases.  Specifically, the lowest amount 
paid if the budget target is met for the least risky project is 182,500 Lira, while the lowest 
amount paid if the budget target is met for the most risky project is 40,000 Lira.   
The last component of the variance is the probability of attaining the budget 
target.  This component simulates downside risk, which is the probability of the worst 
case scenario occurring, in this case missing the budget target (Shapira 1994).  The 
probability of attaining the budget target impacts the highest amount that can be received 
if the budget target is attained.  Specifically, all projects presented have equivalent 
expected values of 185,000 Lira.  Therefore, the components mentioned above all impact 
the value of the highest amount that can be received if the budget target is met.  The 
probability of attaining the budget target, in particular, dictates the percentage chance that 
an individual will or will not attain the budget target.  This, in turn, dictates whether the 
individual will receive the base salary if the budget target is not attained, or some equally 
likely number within the range of the lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget 
target is met. 
The variance, as described above, is measured as the difference between the 
lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget target is attained because this difference 
captures the parameters that are used to define risk in this study.   Therefore, the variance 
of a particular project selected is used as the dependent variable for hypothesis one.  
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Although the variances of projects differ across the experimental conditions, the 
variances are designed to bias against finding results for hypothesis one.  Attempts were 
made to create equal variances for each project, however, this lead to unequal expected 
values of the projects.  Therefore, the decision was made to include variances that differ 
between experimental conditions, which bias against results, rather than to present 
projects that varied in expected value. 
The dependent variable for hypothesis two is the change in an individual‟s 
reference level.  Before the main experiment, individuals answered the following 
question, “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative 
emotion?”  The answer to this question serves as an individual‟s baseline reference level, 
or reference level at time t = 0.  This question was asked after participants were informed 
of their compensation contract.  After each period of the main experiment individuals 
answered this question again, thus creating reference levels at times, t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  The 
dependent variable, change in reference level, is measured as the difference between an 
individual‟s reference level at t = 5 and the baseline reference level, t= 0.  Additional 
measures were created for sensitivity analysis but the results of hypothesis two are 
presented based on the measurement described above. 
The dependent variable for hypothesis three assesses whether individuals exhibit a 
change in risk-taking behavior over time.  This variable is measured as the difference 
between an individual‟s project selection in period 1 versus the project selection in period 
5.  Thus, this measure will capture the difference in the level of risk an individual was 
willing to take over time.   
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4.2.3 Control Variables 
There are a number of control variables that were measured during the 
experiment.  The first control variable was individuals‟ innate risk preferences.  
Individuals can have differing attitudes towards risk, which may impact their selection of 
risky alternatives.  Therefore, a risk preference task from Holt and Laury (2002) was 
included to capture individual risk preferences.  This scale requires individuals to select 
between two alternatives.  One of the alternatives was more “safe” while another was 
more “risky.”  In total ten selections were made.  Individuals‟ innate risk preference was 
measured as the number of risky choices made out of the ten selections.  Therefore, a 
higher score on the risk preference scale indicated that the individual is more risk-
seeking.  
A loss-aversion scale from Brink and Rankin (2011) was included to measure 
individuals‟ innate loss aversion.  The scale is similar to the risk preference scale and 
required individuals to select between two alternatives.  The difference, however, is that 
the alternatives in the loss aversion scale vary the amount of possible loss that an 
individual could incur.  Specifically, one option presented a small gain versus a small 
loss, and the expected value of the outcome was zero.  The other option presented a 
positive gain of $6.67 versus increasing levels of losses.  As participants moved down the 
scale, the possible loss from this option increased to the point where the loss was larger 
than the possible gain of $6.67.  An individual‟s innate loss-aversion was measured as the 
number of loss-averse selections made.  Therefore, a higher score on the loss-aversion 
scale indicates that the individual is more loss-averse.  An individual who is extremely 
averse to losses may only select less risky projects.  On the other hand, individuals who 
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are not averse to losses may select riskier projects.  Therefore, this measure was included 
to rule out this possibility.      
In the proposed statistical analysis of hypothesis two and hypothesis three, a 
control variable for future expectations was included in the analysis.  To assess future 
expectations, individuals were asked the following question: “What do you think the 
outcome of your decision in the next period will be?”  This question was asked after 
every period of the main experimental task.  This question was included to capture 
individual‟s expectations of future economic outcomes, that is, their expectation of the 
outcome in the next period.  According to expectations-based reference dependent 
preferences, expectations of future economic events influence the setting of individuals‟ 
reference levels.  Therefore, it is necessary to control for individuals‟ future expectations 
of economic outcomes.
31
 
In the analysis, future expectations are always related to the period before the 
reference level period.  For example, in hypothesis two, future expectations recorded 
after period four were included in the statistical tests.  The dependent variable for 
hypothesis two is the change in reference level comparing the baseline reference level in 
period zero to the reference level reported in period five.  Therefore, the future 
expectations from the period before the final reference level measure were included in the 
statistical analysis.  Participants‟ future expectations for a particular period always lagged 
one period behind the reference level period.   
 
 
                                                          
31
 Future expectations were not significant in any hypothesis test.  Therefore, it is not presented in the tests 
of hypotheses. 
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Variable Name Question/Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Project Selection 
Variance 
The variance of the project a participant selects 
 
Change in Project 
Selection Variance  
The difference between the project variance in period 5 and 
the project variance in period 1 
 
Reference Level At what level of payment would you have neither positive 
nor negative emotion? 
 
Change in Reference 
Level 
Difference between current period reference level and the 
baseline reference level at t = 0  
Independent Variable  
Budget Condition Two budget target levels: easy and moderate.  Manipulated 
through annual base salary (15,000 – easy, 30,000 – 
moderate) and probability of meeting the budget target. 
 
Attained Budget Target Count variable which adds the number of times an individual 
has attained the budget target.  Different depending on the 
period of interest 
Covariates  
Risk Preference Measured using the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference 
task which captures individual‟s innate risk preferences.  
Measure ranges from 0 – 10, with higher scores representing 
more risk-seeking. 
 
Loss Aversion Measured using the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion 
task which captures individual‟s innate loss aversion.  
Measure ranges from 0 – 10, with higher scores representing 
more loss aversion. 
 
Economic Outcome Participant compensation for a period, presented in Lira  
 
Attained Budget Targett=i Dichotomous variable equal to one if participant attained the 
budget target in period I and equal to zero if not. 
 
Future Expectations What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next 
period will be? 
FIGURE 3. Variable Definition 
 
The last control variable is economic outcome.  This variable was also included as 
a control variable for hypothesis two and hypothesis three.  Economic outcome relates to 
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the outcome an individual had in a prior period.  According to expectations-based 
reference dependent preferences, outcomes of prior decisions impact the setting of 
individuals‟ reference levels.  In the statistical analysis, economic outcomes are always 
related to the reference level period.  For example, if change in reference level is 
comparing the reference level from period zero to period five, then economic outcomes 
would be measured as the economic outcome from an individual‟s decision in period 
five. 
An alternative measure for economic outcomes was based on whether or not an 
individual attained the budget target in the prior period.  Therefore, Attained Budget 
Target was a dichotomous variable equal to one if an individual attained the budget target 
and zero if they failed to attain the budget target.  Both measures of economic outcomes 
were included in the appropriate hypotheses tests.   
4.3 Experimental Task and Procedure  
The experimental procedures described in this section are modified from Sprinkle 
et al. (2008).   The business context of the experiment is modified from Chow et al. 
(2007).  The experiment was conducted using a web-based software program. When 
participants entered the experimental site they were seated at individual computers.  The 
session leader then informed participants that they would be completing several activities 
and that the entire experiment would last approximately one hour.  Before beginning any 
tasks relating to the experiment participants read an instruction page that thanks them for 
their participation and also serves as IRB informed consent.   
Participants then logged onto their computers and entered the URL address 
providing a link to the experimental materials.  Upon entering the URL address, 
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participants read instructions related to a letter decoding task that was similar to a task 
derived from Chow (1983).  The purpose of the letter decoding task was not to garner 
information related to the dependent variables of interest.  Instead, the letter decoding 
task enabled participants to earn the right to continue on in the experiment and make 
selections between lotteries, rather than being endowed the right to select between 
lotteries.
32
  Prior research has demonstrated that participants make different choices 
depending on whether they earn or are endowed with their choice (Hoffman and Spitzer 
1985; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994; Boylan and Sprinkle 2001).   
In the letter decoding task participants were shown a decoding key that assigns 
specific numbers to letters.  For example, twenty-six could be assigned to A, and fourteen 
to letter B, etc.
33
  In order to answer a particular problem, individuals had to look up a 
particular letter and then enter in the corresponding number.  In addition to providing 
information on how the letter decoding task works, the instructions also informed 
participants they would earn $2 for completing this portion of the experiment.  
Additionally, participants were informed that they must decode fifty-five letters in the 
main decoding session to earn the right to continue participating in the experiment.  They 
were also informed they have the opportunity to earn significantly more money in the 
latter stages of the experiment.  Participants who did not meet the performance 
requirement were paid $2 and asked to leave the experiment.   
                                                          
32
 Tasks after the letter decoding task require participants select between lotteries.  Additionally, the main 
experimental task could be viewed as a lottery selection.  Therefore, it was important to ensure participants 
earned the right to choose between lotteries rather than be endowed with the right to choose between 
lotteries. 
33
 An example letter decoding key is presented in Appendix B. 
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After reading the instructions for the letter decoding task participants performed a 
one-minute training session to familiarize themselves with the task.  Feedback related to 
individual performance was provided following the completion of the one-minute 
training session.  The feedback contained the correct number of letters decoded as well as 
the number of incorrect letters decoded.   
Participants then completed one main letter decoding session that lasted for three 
minutes.  After the main decoding session participants received feedback highlighting the 
number of correctly and incorrectly decoded letters to numbers.  Once the main letter 
decoding session was complete, any participant who did not meet the minimal 
performance requirement was paid $2 and asked to leave the experiment.
34
   
Participants were then asked to complete a risk preference task (Holt and Laury 
2002) and a loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011).   These tasks were included to 
capture individuals‟ risk preferences, which indicate individuals‟ propensity for risk, 
whereas the loss aversion task captured how individuals react to possible losses.  Before 
completing the risk preference and loss aversion tasks participants were informed that 
they would be compensated based on one randomly selected lottery from each task, thus 
placing monetary incentives on their selections of lotteries.   
Before participants completed the risk preference and loss aversion tasks they 
were asked a question to ensure they understood how they were being compensated for 
these two tasks.  Participants had five chances to answer this question correctly.  After a 
fifth attempt to answer the question correctly participants were informed of the correct 
                                                          
34
 A similar effort-intensive exercise was used in Sprinkle et al. (2008) and no participants failed to meet 
the performance requirement.  Decoding fifty-five letters in a three session was not considered to be a 
difficult achievement.  However, a number of participants failed the letter decoding performance 
requirement. 
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answer.  This provided assurance that participants understood the compensation aspect of 
these two tasks.   Participants were informed of their earnings from the completion of 
these two tasks at the end of the experiment.
35
 
After completing the risk preference and loss aversion tasks participants were 
shown an introduction page for the main experimental task.  The page informed 
participants that they would be compensated based on two randomly selected periods 
from the main experimental sessions.
36
  Participants were also told that their actual 
payments based on their selections in the main experimental session would be calculated 
based on a conversion of experimental currency (Lira) to U.S. dollars at a rate of 20,000 
Lira to $1 U.S. dollar.  The average compensation per participant was $24.54 for all 
participants and $30.30 for those participants who passed the letter decoding performance 
requirement. 
Although the main experimental task was modified from Sprinkle et al. (2008) it 
was set in the context of the Chow et al. (2007) study.  Participants were shown a 
narrative describing ABC Company.  ABC Company was described as a manufacturing 
firm that produces a wide array of products in any given year.  Participants were asked to 
assume the role of a product manager for ABC Company and were told that as product 
manager they are responsible for selecting which product to produce.  Participants were 
informed that ABC Company has more than one product manager and that all products 
they select to manufacture and market are short-term in nature and that each products‟ 
                                                          
35
 Participants were informed of their compensation from the risk preference and loss aversion tasks at the 
end of the experiment so that money earned from these tasks was not included in individuals reference 
levels, avoiding any potential impact on individuals decision making in the main experiment task. 
36 Participants were not informed of how many periods were in the main experimental task to avoid 
strategic decision making and end-game effects. 
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duration will be one year.  The materials stated that each product manager is allocated 
funds each year to select and manufacture one product out of a myriad of options that will 
be provided and all products have equivalent costs to manufacture and market.   
The background page also contained information relating to the budget target 
manipulation.  Specifically, participants were told that ABC Company pays its product 
managers an annual base salary plus a bonus based on returns above a budget threshold.
37
  
In the easy (moderate) budget target condition, participants were informed that their 
annual base salary is 15,000 (30,000) Lira and the budget threshold level was set such 
that most (few) alternatives guarantee the attainment of the budget target.  Accordingly, 
in the easy budget target condition five out of the seven alternatives guarantee the 
attainment of the budget target while in the moderate budget target condition only two of 
the seven alternatives guarantee the attainment of the budget target. 
After reading the description of ABC Company and being informed of the budget 
target condition, the materials described how managers are compensated.  Participants 
were then shown two examples that describe in detail all information relating to the 
project information presented.
 38,39
  The examples presented four pieces of information to 
participants: probability of meeting the budget, amount paid if budget is not met, lowest 
amount paid if budget is met, and highest amount paid if budget is met.  If the budget is 
met, participants will be paid an amount between the lowest and highest amount paid if 
the budget is met, with each value having an equal probability of selection.   
                                                          
37
 In the experimental materials, budget targets were referred to as budget thresholds (Sprinkle et al. 2008). 
38 The term product and project are used interchangeably.  Participants saw the term product in the 
experiment.  The term project is in most cases for ease of reading and interpretation. 
39
 The product examples followed procedure similar to Sprinkle et al. (2008) who used two demo projects 
as examples for participants.  Both of the two examples had expected values that were significantly lower 
than the projects that are presented in the main experimental sessions.  The explanation will explain what 
each piece of information represents and how to calculate average payments. 
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The information that is presented is consistent with prior literature that suggests 
managers make risky decisions by taking into account the worst case scenario (not 
meeting the budget, amount paid if budget not met), the probability of meeting a target 
(probability of meeting budget target), and the best case scenarios (lowest and highest 
amounts paid if budget is met) (Shapira 1994).  The presentation format is identical to 
Sprinkle et al. (2008) and is different from most studies of risky decision making that 
generally rely on presenting participants with probability distributions (e.g., Chow et al. 
2007).   
The information presented in the easy (moderate) budget target condition for the 
two example problems was consistent with the manipulations of budget target.  
Specifically, the amount paid if the budget is not met was equivalent to the annual base 
salary that participants were informed they would receive.  The example problems for 
both budget target conditions had equivalent expected values.  Based on the information 
presented in Figure 4, this project has a 65 percent chance of meeting the budget and 
therefore has a 35 percent chance of missing the budget.  If the budget target is not met 
then the manager would be paid his/her annual base salary, 15,000.  If, however, the 
budget target is attained, then the manager would be paid some amount ranging between 
170,000 and 268,462, with each value having an equal probability of occurring.  
Therefore, the average pay for attaining the budget, based on Figure 4, would be 219,231.   
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Product A – Low Budget Condition  
Probability of Meeting the Budget 65% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met 15,000  
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 170,000 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 268,462 
FIGURE 4. Example Project Problem 
 
There is a second project example that illustrates the same information using 
different parameters.  Specifically, the second project example guaranteed the attainment 
of the budget target.  Once participants were satisfied with the first two example projects, 
they were shown two additional example projects that did not include any descriptions 
and were asked a number of questions.  For each example project there were three 
questions.  The three questions were: (1) For Product A (B), what is the probability the 
budget will not be met? (2) For Product A (B), what amount will the manager earn if the 
budget threshold is not met? (3) For Product A (B), what is the expected average payoff 
if the budget threshold is met?  These questions were designed to ascertain whether 
participants understood the project information that was presented and how managers are 
compensated based on their project selection.   
Once participants answered the understanding questions satisfactorily,
40
 they were 
reminded that they would be compensated based on two randomly selected rounds of the 
main experimental task and that they were to assume the role of a product manager.  
Additionally, participants were shown their annual base salary and how their budget 
target level was set (easy or moderate).  Before beginning the actual experimental task, 
                                                          
40
 Participants who answered the understanding questions incorrectly the first time were asked to answer 
them again.  If they did not correctly answer the questions after two attempts the correct answer was 
provided.  The number of attempts to correctly answer these questions was recorded. 
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participants answered a number of questions.  They answered a reference level question, 
which asked participants, “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor 
negative emotion?”  The reference level question was asked prior to the main 
experimental task in order to ascertain individuals‟ reference levels that were used in 
making the initial period project selection and served as the baseline reference level to 
ascertain whether reference levels change over the course of the experiment.   
Additionally, participants were asked a question relating to the main experiment 
compensation.  Specifically, participants were asked, “Of all the product decisions you 
will make, how many will be randomly selected and used as a basis for your experimental 
compensation?”  Participants had five attempts to answer this question correctly.  After a 
fifth attempt participants were informed of the correct answer.  This question provided 
assurance that participants understood how they were to be compensated for their 
decisions in the main experimental task. 
After answering the reference level and compensation question, participants 
began the main experiment.  During each session the computer program displayed the 
same seven projects in varying order, thereby controlling for ordering effects.  The seven 
projects were designed to simulate a risk-return relationship.  Specifically, taking lower 
risks generally entails “safer” returns, whereby there is a smaller variance between the 
lowest and highest amounts that could be received.  Taking higher risks, on the other 
hand, generally provides the opportunity for higher returns, yet provides the possibility of 
lower returns (Unser 2000; Klos, Weber, and Weber 2005; Rossi and Timmerman 2010).  
The simulation of the risk-return relationship was incorporated in the variance of 
payments between the lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget is met.  As can be 
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seen in Figure 5, the variance incorporated in each project increases going from project 
one to project seven.  For example, the variance for project one was 5,000 while the 
variance for project two was 10,000.   
In both budget target conditions, the lowest amount paid if the budget is met was 
held constant.  The highest amount paid if the budget is met, however, varied between 
budget target conditions because of a number of differences between the budget target 
conditions.  One of the differences was the amount of annual base pay.  In the easy 
budget target condition, the annual base salary was 15,000, which corresponds to the 
amount paid if the budget is not met.  In the moderate budget target condition, the annual 
base salary was 30,000.  In order to maintain equivalent expected values between 
conditions, the highest amount paid if the budget target is attained was different for all 
projects except projects one and two.  
Another reason for differences in the highest amount paid was the manipulation of 
the probability of meeting the budget target.  The probability of meeting the budget target 
was also a factor of risk, in addition to the variance of each project.  Prior research has 
suggested that measures such as variance do not adequately capture risk because 
variance, for example in a probability distribution, captures positive returns as well as 
negative returns (Unser 2000).  Therefore, the probability of meeting the budget was 
included as a measure of downside risk, which research suggests is used by managers in 
risky decision making (Shapira 1994).  The downside risk in this case was the possibility 
of missing the budget target.  The probability of meeting the budget target was 
manipulated for certain projects to simulate differences between moderate and easy 
budget targets.  For projects one, two, six, and seven, the probability of meeting the 
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budget target remained the same in both budget target conditions.  In the easy budget 
target condition, the probability of meeting the budget for projects three, four, and five 
was 100 percent.   
 
Easy Budget Target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Probability of Meeting the Budget 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60% 55% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 15,000 15,000 
Lowest Amount Paid if the Budget is 
Met 
182,500 180,000 167,500 95,000 80,000 65,000 40,000 
Highest Amount Paid if the Budget 
is Met 
187,500 190,000 202,500 275,000 290,000 531,667 608,182 
Expected Value 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 
Variance 5,000 10,000 35,000 180,000 210,000 466,667 568,182 
 
Moderate Budget Target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Probability of Meeting the Budget 100% 100% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met N/A N/A 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
Lowest Amount Paid if the Budget is 
Met 
182,500 180,000 167,500 95,000 80,000 65,000 40,000 
Highest Amount Paid if the Budget 
is Met 
187,500 190,000 305,833 407,857 456,923 511,667 583,636 
Expected Value 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 
Variance 5,000 10,000 138,333 312,857 376,923 446,667 543,636 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Projects to Select from for Easy and Moderate Budget Target Conditions 
 
In the moderate budget target condition, however, the percentages of attaining the 
budget target were the same or lower, simulating a more difficult budget target to attain.  
For project three, the probability of attaining the budget target was 75 percent in the 
moderate budget target condition, compared to 100 percent in the easy budget target 
condition.  For project 4 the percentage falls to 70 percent (100 percent in easy budget 
target condition) and for project five the percentage falls to 65 percent (100 percent in the 
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easy budget target condition).  The decrease in the percentage chance of attaining the 
budget also corresponded to an increase in variance.  Thus both indicators of risk 
(variance and probability of attaining the budget) increased from project three to project 
seven in the moderate budget target condition.  The probability of attaining the budget 
target was 60 percent and 55 percent respectively for projects 6 and 7. 
In the main experimental sessions participants selected which project they wished 
to produce, which entailed manufacturing and marketing a product.  The variance of the 
project selected served as one of the main dependent variables in the study.  This 
dependent variable identified the level of risk participants were willing to take in their 
initial project selection decision.  After the first project selection, participants were shown 
whether or not they attained the budget target and the economic outcome of their decision 
in Lira.  Then participants answered questions about their reference level and their 
expectations of future economic outcomes for the next period.  For future expectations, 
participants answered the following question, “What do you think the outcome of your 
decision in the next period will be?”  Answers to the question relating to reference levels 
served as a main dependent variable for hypothesis two.  The rest of the main 
experimental sessions continued in the same fashion.  For each period, the projects 
presented were the same.  The order in which the projects were presented, however, 
varied each period so that no participant saw the same order of projects twice.
41
  
After completing the five experimental periods participants were asked to 
complete a post-experimental questionnaire.  The post experimental questionnaire 
contained a manipulation check question for budget target level and general demographic 
                                                          
41
 There were five different orders of projects, one for each period.  The sequences of the five specific 
orders of projects were also varied between participants. 
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questions.  In addition to demographic questions, the post experimental questionnaire 
asked participants how important it was to meet their budget target.  There were also 
questions addressing whether participants made their project selection decisions in the 
experiment as if they were facing a real world situation.  Additional questions ascertained 
the degree to which participants‟ decision making was influenced by their budget target 
and how important it was for the participant to attain the budget target.  Once participants 
completed the post-experimental questionnaire they were debriefed, paid, and dismissed. 
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5.0 RESULTS 
 
The results section begins with a discussion of the study‟s participants, which 
includes information on the participants and identifying those participants excluded from 
statistical analysis.  I then present descriptive statistics on variables of interest in the 
study.  The assumptions applicable to the statistical tests used are analyzed, following 
which I present the results of the tests of hypotheses.  I then conclude this section by 
discussing supplemental analysis. 
5.1 Analysis of Participant Demographic Information and Responses 
Fifty-five individuals participated in the experiment.  The participants were 
recruited from upper-level accounting courses at a large university in the Southeastern 
United States.  Due to the nature of the task, upper-level accounting students were 
suitable participants.  As per Table 5.1 Panel A, there were fifty-five participants who 
participated in the experiment.  Of the fifty-five participants, twenty-seven participants in 
the experiment were in the easy budget target condition and twenty-eight participants 
were in the moderate budget target condition.   
In the easy budget target condition, four of the twenty-seven individuals failed the 
letter-decoding performance requirement.  The requirement was to decode fifty-five 
letters into numbers during a three minute session.  In addition, three individuals in the 
easy budget target condition provided irrational answers to the risk preference scale.
42
   
                                                          
42 The three individuals continually switched decisions between risk-averse and risk-seeking. 
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TABLE 5.1. Participant Demographic Statistics 
Panel A: Description of Participant Sample 
 Easy Budget 
Target 
Moderate Budget 
Target Total 
 
 
Total Participants 27 28 55 
 
 
Failed Performance 
Requirement 4 8 12 
 
 
Irrational Risk 
Preference Behavior 3 0 3 
 
 
Participants Used in 
Subsequent Analysis 20 20 40 
 
Panel B: Participant Demographic Statistics 
 Easy Budget 
Target 
(s.d.) 
Moderate Budget 
Target 
(s.d.) 
Total 
(s.d.) 
Significance 
level 
(p-value) 
 
Gender 
 
30% 75% 52.5% 
3.192 
(0.01)
a
 
 
Age 
 
23.2 
(4.086) 
23.5 
(3.502) 
23.35 
(3.759) 
0.062 
(0.80)
b 
 
Work Experience 
 
2.5 
(3.487) 
2.6 
(3.912) 
2.55 
(3.658) 
0.007 
(0.93)
b 
a
 Tested using Chi-Square analysis. Percentages presented as the percentage of men in each condition.  
Significance of Chi-Square value. 
b Tested using univariate comparison of means.  Significance of F-Value. 
 
Therefore these three individuals were not included in the analysis as risk preference is an 
important control variable.  Eight participants in the moderate budget target condition 
failed the letter-decoding performance requirement.  These exclusions left twenty 
observations in the easy budget target condition and twenty observations in the moderate 
budget target condition for subsequent statistical analysis.   
Panel B of Table 5.1 illustrates that there were no statistically significant 
differences of participants in the easy budget target condition and the moderate budget 
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target condition regarding age and work experience.  There was, however, a statistically 
significant difference in gender across conditions (p = 0.01).  As can be seen in Table 5.1 
Panel B only 30 percent (6 participants) were male in the easy budget target condition 
while 75 percent (15 participants) were male in the moderate budget target condition.  
Because this variable is different across conditions a dichotomous variable controlling for 
gender was included in all hypotheses tests.   
Every participant answered a post-experimental questionnaire that asked 
numerous questions.  All of the questions were answered on a nine-point Likert scale (1 = 
Not at all, 9 = Completely).  As can be seen in Table 5.2 participants in the easy budget 
target condition ( ̅ = 7.25) perceived that their budget target was easier to attain than 
individuals in the moderate budget target   ̅ = 6.10) and this difference is statistically 
significant (p = 0.06).  Additionally, the table shows a significant difference (p = 0.08) in 
how the budget target impacted participants‟ evaluation of the projects.    
Table 5.2 also illustrates that overall participants felt the budget target was 
important ( ̅ = 7.93), that the budget target affected project selection ( ̅ = 7.48), that the 
experiment was easy to understand ( ̅ = 8.28), and there were not too many projects to 
select from ( ̅ = 2.98).   
Participants in both budget target conditions perceived that their budget target was 
not difficult to attain ( ̅ = 3.35).43  Although participants in the easy budget target 
condition had a lower overall response ( ̅ = 3.00) than the moderate budget target 
condition ( ̅ = 3.70) there was no statistically significant difference between the budget 
target conditions.  This could imply that individuals felt the budget target was not 
                                                          
43
 All response means were significantly different from the 9-point Likert scale neutral point of four and a 
half at p =< 0.01. 
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difficult to attain because in both budget target conditions there were projects that 
guaranteed the attainment of the budget target.  To further examine whether individuals 
perceived a difference between budget targets conditions, a composite variable was 
created.  The composite variable contained responses to “Budget target was easy to 
attain” and reverse coded responses to “Budget target was difficult to attain”.  As can be 
seen in Table 5.2, there is a statistically significant difference between conditions (p = 
0.02), which suggests the manipulation of budget target difficulty was successful.   
 
TABLE 5.2. Participants Perceptions Regarding the Experiment 
Participant Responses to Post Experimental Questionnaire 
 Easy  
Budget Target 
n = 20 
(s.d.) 
Moderate 
Budget Target 
n = 20 
(s.d.) 
Total 
N = 40 
(s.d.) p-value
a
 
Budget target was easy to attain 
7.25 
(1.65) 
6.10 
(2.15) 
6.68 
(1.979) 
0.06 
Evaluation of alternatives depended 
upon my budget target 
7.40 
(1.759) 
6.20 
(2.462) 
6.80 
(2.198) 
0.08 
The budget target was important to 
me 
8.00 
(2.152) 
7.85 
(1.599) 
7.93 
(1.873) 
0.80 
Budget target affected my product 
selection 
7.25 
(1.773) 
7.70 
(1.525) 
7.48 
(1.648) 
0.39 
Budget target was difficult to attain 
3.00 
(1.892) 
3.70 
(2.003) 
3.35 
(1.955) 
0.26 
Experiment was easy to understand 
8.25 
(1.251) 
8.30 
(1.302) 
8.28 
(1.261) 
0.90 
There were too many projects to 
select from 
2.95 
(1.849) 
3.00 
(1.947) 
2.98 
(1.874) 
0.93 
Combination of Easy to Attain and 
Difficult to Attain
b
 
14.45 
(2.564) 
12.40 
(2.780) 
13.43 
(2.836) 
0.02 
a
 One-way ANOVAs were conducted for all comparisons between conditions. 
b This variable is a combination of (1) budget target was easy to attain and the reverse coding of (2) budget 
target was difficult to attain.   
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5.2 Experiment Understanding, Manipulation Check Question, and Compensation 
Check Questions 
 
Participants were also asked a number of questions regarding their understanding 
of the project information that was presented every period.  Figure 6 contains the 
questions that were asked to ascertain participants understanding relating to two example 
problems.
44
  Table 5.3 contains the results of these questions.  Three of the six questions 
were answered correctly by all of the participants.  Question three for Product A 
pertained to the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met.  Thirty-three of 
the forty participants (82.5 percent) answered this question correctly on the first attempt 
and there was no statistically significant difference between the budget target conditions.  
Of the seven (17.5 percent) who missed this question on the first attempt, five (12.5 
percent) answered correctly on their second attempt.  Only two (5 percent) participants 
failed to answer this question correctly in two attempts.   
 
Product A 
For Product A, the probability of not meeting the budget is… 
For Product A, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is… 
For Product A, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met? 
Product B 
For Product B, the probability of not meeting the budget is… 
For Product B, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is… 
For Product B, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met? 
 
FIGURE 6. Experiment Understanding Questions 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 Participants answered questions relating to two products, A and B.  These products had equal expected 
values across budget target conditions.  Product A did not guarantee the attainment of the budget target.  
Product B did guarantee the attainment of the budget target.  The expected value of both Product A and 
Product B were lower than the expected values of the projects presented in the main experiment.  
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TABLE 5.3. Experimental Task Understanding  
Participant Task Understanding Questions
a 
 Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall 
Product A Question 1
b 
100% 100% 100% 
Product A Question 2
c 
100% 100% 100% 
Product A Question 3
d 
90% 75% 82.5% 
Product B Question 1
b 
100% 100% 100% 
Product B Question 2
c 
95% 90% 92.5% 
Product B Question 3
d 
95% 100% 97.5% 
a
 Percentages presented as percent who answered correctly on the first attempt.  Participants were given two 
attempts to answer correctly.  After the second attempt the correct answer was shown 
b
 Question about the probability of not meeting the budget for example products A and B 
c
 Question about the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met for example products A and B 
d 
Question about the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met for example products A and B 
    
For Product B, question two, thirty-seven (92.5 percent) of the participants 
answered correctly on the first attempt and the remaining three participants (7.5 percent) 
answered correctly on the second attempt.  For Product B question three, thirty-nine (97.5 
percent) answered correctly on the first attempt and one participant (2.5 percent) 
answered correctly on the second attempt.  There were no statistically significant 
differences between the budget target conditions.  These results suggest that participants 
had a thorough understanding of the project information that was presented to them.  The 
two participants (5 percent) who failed to answer the questions correctly were shown the 
correct answer before they were allowed to move forward in the experiment.
45
 
Contained in the post experiment questionnaire there was one manipulation check 
question to ensure that the experimental manipulation was successful.  In addition there 
were two compensation related questions asked during the experiment to ensure that 
participants understood how they were being compensated for their decisions.  Figure 7 
                                                          
45 Results of the hypotheses tests are qualitatively unchanged when they are removed from the statistical 
analysis. 
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contains the experiment manipulation check question as well as the two compensation 
related questions.   
 
 
Experiment Manipulation Question 
Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target 
would be attained? 
 
Most, Few 
Compensation Check Questions 
 
 
Risk Preference/Loss Aversion  
Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options.  For an 
individual task (ten sets of options), how many rows will be randomly 
selected for compensation? 
 
1, 2, 3, 5, 7 
Main Experiment  
Of all the product selection decisions you will make, how many will be 
randomly selected and used as a basis for your experimental 
compensation? 
1, 2, 3, 5, 
10 
 
FIGURE 7. Experiment Manipulation Check Question and Compensation Check 
Questions 
 
 
 
The results of these manipulation checks are presented in Table 5.4.  Nineteen of 
the twenty participants in the easy budget target condition correctly answered the 
experiment manipulation check question.  However, only fourteen of the twenty 
participants in the moderate budget target condition answered the question correctly.  A 
Chi-square test to assess whether the percentages of passing/failing were different across 
budget target conditions reveals there is a statistically significant difference (2 = 4.329, p 
= 0.04).  Additional analysis, however, reveals no statistically significant differences in 
the reference levels between the participants who passed and failed the manipulation 
check (F = 0.892, p = 0.51).  There is also no significant difference in product selection 
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variance (F = 0.568, p = 0.72).
46
  The hypotheses tests and sensitivity analysis compares 
statistical results with and without those who passed the manipulation check question.  
The results for the two compensation related checks are presented in Table 5.4 
Panels B and C.  In these questions participants were given as many attempts as 
necessary to answer the questions correctly and the experiment program tracked the 
number of attempts per participant.  As can be seen in Panel B Table 5.4, twenty (50 
percent) of the participants correctly answered the risk preference/loss aversion 
compensation question correctly on the first attempt.  In total, twenty-nine (72.5 percent) 
of the participants answered this question correctly in the first two attempts.  One 
participant (2.5 percent) took three attempts, five participants (12.5 percent) took four 
attempts, four participants (10 percent) took five attempts, and one participant (2.5 
percent) took six attempts.  There are no statistically significant differences between the 
budget target conditions (2 = 5.711, p = 0.34) in the number of attempts for the risk 
preference/loss aversion question.  There is also no significant difference in the risk 
preference measure based on the number of attempts to answer this question correctly (F 
= 0.495, p = 0.49).  However, there is a statistically significant difference in the loss 
aversion measure based on whether a participant answered this question correctly on the 
first attempt or not (F = 4.179, p = 0.05).
 47
   
 
                                                          
46
 Both tests were conducted using MANOVA due to the correlation between the reference levels and the 
correlation between the product selection variances.  Results of a univariate analysis are qualitatively the 
same. 
47 For both of these tests the independent variable was a dichotomous variable equal to one if a participant 
answered correctly on the first attempt and equal to zero if not answered correctly on the first attempt.  This 
increases the power of the statistical tests. 
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TABLE 5.4. Experiment Manipulation Check Question and Compensation Check 
Questions 
Panel A: Manipulation Check Question 
  Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall 
Experiment 
Manipulation 
Check
a 
Pass 
19 
(95%) 
14 
(70%) 
33
b 
(82.5%) 
Fail 
1 
(5%) 
6 
(30%) 
7
b
 
(17.5%) 
Panel B: Risk Preference and Loss Aversion Compensation Question 
  Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall 
Risk Preference 
and Loss 
Aversion 
Compensation 
Question: 
Number of 
Attempts
c 
1 
8 
(40%) 
12 
(60%) 
20 
(50%) 
2 
5 
(25%) 
4 
(20%) 
9 
(22.5%) 
3 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
4 
4 
(20%) 
1 
(5%) 
5 
(12.5%) 
5 
3 
(15%) 
1 
(5%) 
4 
(10%) 
6 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
Total 20 20 40 
Panel C: Main Experiment Compensation Question 
  Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall 
Main Experiment 
Compensation 
Question: 
Number of 
Attempts
d 
1 
10 
(50%) 
14 
(70%) 
24 
(60%) 
2 
7 
(35%) 
4 
(20%) 
11 
(27.5%) 
3 
1 
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
4 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(5%) 
2 
(5%) 
5 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(5%) 
2 
(5%) 
Total 20 20 40 
a
 Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target would be attained? 
b 
Chi-Square test suggests a significant difference between the easy budget target condition and moderate 
budget target condition (2 = 4.329, p = 0.04).  Two cells in this analysis, however, have expected values 
less than five which could bias the Chi-Square value.  This variable was controlled for in statistical 
analysis. 
c
 Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options. For an individual task (ten sets of 
options), how many rows will be randomly selected for compensation? 
d
 Of all the product decisions you will make, how many will be randomly selected and used as a basis for 
your experimental compensation? 
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The data for the main experiment compensation question, which can be seen in 
Table 5.4 Panel C, reveals that twenty-four (60 percent) participants correctly answered 
this question on the first attempt.  An additional eleven (27.5 percent) answered this 
question correctly on their second attempt.  Therefore, thirty-five (87.5 percent) 
participants answered this question correctly in the first two attempts.  One participant 
(2.5 percent) took three attempts, two participants (5 percent) took four attempts and two 
more participants (5 percent) took five attempts to answer this question correctly.  
Multiple tests were conducted to ascertain whether individuals who answered this 
question correctly on the first attempt provided significantly different answers for the 
dependent variables than individuals who did not answer this question correctly on the 
first attempt.
48
  The results suggest that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the two groups for product selection variance (F = 1.226, p = 0.32) or reference 
levels (F = 0.492, p = 0.81).
49
   
5.3 Descriptive Statistics Regarding Dependent Variables and Control Variables of 
Interest  
 
There were a number of control variables that were captured during the 
experiment.  Participants provided their choices on a risk preference and loss aversion 
scale.  Table 5.5 contains the descriptive statistics for these two control variables.  The 
                                                          
48 The independent variable in the tests was a dichotomous variable equal to one if an individual passed on 
the first attempt and zero if they did not pass on the first attempt.  Using all levels of the number of 
attempts creates power issues in the statistical tests and highly unbalanced cell sizes.  The results are 
qualitatively the same. 
49 Both tested using a MANOVA due to the correlations in projects selected between periods.  Results of a 
univariate analysis are qualitatively the same.  The overall omnibus test is statistically insignificant. 
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table illustrates that there are no statistically significant differences between the budget 
target conditions for either risk preference or loss aversion.
50,51
   
 
TABLE 5.5. Risk Preference and Loss Aversion Statistics 
Risk Preference and Loss Aversion by Budget Target Condition 
 Easy Budget 
Target 
n = 20 
(s.d.) 
Moderate 
Budget Target 
n = 20 
(s.d.) 
Total 
N = 40 
(s.d.) 
p-value 
Risk Preference 
3.75 
(2.124) 
3.50 
(1.933) 
3.63 
(2.009) 
0.70 
Loss Aversion 
3.20 
(3.037) 
2.65 
(2.254) 
2.92 
(2.654) 
0.52 
 
There were two main dependent variables used in the statistical analysis, 
reference levels and product selection variance.  Reference levels were measured using 
the following question: “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor 
negative emotion?”  Participants answered this question before beginning the main 
experiment and every period after they had received information regarding the economic 
outcomes of the period before.  Therefore, there are six reference level measures.  The 
descriptive statistics for reference levels based on budget target condition and by period 
are presented in Table 5.6. 
 
                                                          
50
 The risk preference measure is on a 10-point scale, with higher scores indicating a risk-seeking attitude 
and lower scores indicating a risk-averse attitude.  A score of five would indicate risk neutrality.  All values 
presented are significantly different than the mid-point of five by p <=0.05. 
51
 The loss aversion measure is a 10-point scale with higher scores indicating greater loss aversion and 
lower scores indicating lower loss aversion.  A score of five is the mid-point.  All values presented are 
significantly different than the mid-point of five by p <=0.05. 
77 
 
TABLE 5.6. Descriptive Statistics for Reference Level 
Reference Level by Period and Budget Target Condition 
 Reference Level  
Period 
Easy Budget Target 
(s.d.) 
Moderate Budget 
Target (s.d.) 
Total 
(s.d.) 
p-value 
0 
54,250.00 
(68,906.40) 
37,000.00 
(28,672.38) 
45,625.00 
(52,820.30) 
0.31 
1 
131,581.00 
(94,812.21) 
78,750.00 
(68,784.08) 
105,165.50 
(86,023.65) 
0.05 
2 
124,375.00 
(68,594.32) 
76,000 
(67,621.24) 
100,187.50 
(71,554.15) 
0.03 
3 
127,850.00 
(65,749.35) 
77,000 
(64,571.46) 
102,425.00 
(69,284.58) 
0.01 
4 
129,125.00 
(75,877.65) 
80,750.00 
(63,126.34) 
104,937.50 
(73,118.47) 
0.03 
5 
140,500.00 
(88,732.30) 
108,250.00 
(82,130.75) 
124,375.00 
(85,957.56) 
0.24 
Total 
117,946.83 
(81,573.59) 
76,291.67 
(66,568.02) 
97,119.25 
(77,169.86) 
0.00 
 
 
Table 5.6 shows that individuals in the easy budget target condition had a higher 
baseline reference level ( ̅ = 54,250.00) than in the moderate budget target condition ( ̅ = 
37,000.00).  The difference is not statistically significant but is unexpected.  Before a task 
has begun, an individual should have no expectations of future economic outcomes.  
When there are no expectations, an individual‟s reference level should theoretically be 
based on exogenous factors, such as contract parameters.  In this case, individuals in the 
easy budget target condition should have reference levels around 15,000 and individuals 
in the moderate budget target condition should have reference levels around 30,000.   
In the easy budget target condition, eleven out of twenty participants (55 percent) 
reported a reference level of 15,000.  Four (20 percent) reported a reference level of 
100,000.  In the moderate budget target condition, fourteen out of twenty participants (70 
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percent) reported an initial reference level of 30,000.  Three participants (15 percent) 
reported a reference level of 100,000.  It could be that after individuals were informed of 
their compensation contracts, they began to formulate expectations.  Specifically, in the 
easy budget target condition, participants were informed that their budget target had been 
set so that a majority of the projects presented allowed them to attain their budget target 
with certainty.  Therefore, individuals could have impounded this information into their 
expectations, which could be reflected in the slightly higher baseline reference level for 
those in the easy budget target condition. 
Table 5.6 also shows there are significant univariate differences between easy and 
moderate budget target conditions for periods one, two, three, and four, as well as 
significant differences in the overall means between the easy and moderate budget target 
conditions.
52
  Although there are no hypotheses relating to reference level and budget 
target condition, it is interesting to see how reference levels shifted over time based on 
budget target condition.  Figure 8 suggests the largest change in reference level occurs 
from the initial reference level (before the main experiment) and period1.  After period 1 
the reference levels of participants appears to flatten out from period 1 to period 5.  This 
pattern suggests that participants adjust their expectations after the conclusion of the first 
period, and any adjustments after the first period were of much smaller magnitude on 
average. 
 
                                                          
52 In period zero, the expectation is that a majority of participants would have a reference level equal to the 
base annual salary.  In the easy budget target condition, eleven out of twenty participants reported a 
reference level of 15,000.  Four reported a reference level of 100,000.  In the moderate budget target 
condition, fourteen out of twenty participants reported an initial reference level of 30,000.  Three 
participants reported a reference level of 100,000. 
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FIGURE 8. Mean Reference Level over Time 
 
Table 5.7 presents descriptive statistics with regards to project selection variance.  
Panel A of Table 5.7 presents information relating to the actual projects selected, by 
budget target condition.  Overall, the total row suggests that individuals selected different 
products depending on which budget target condition they were in.  Specifically, there 
are pronounced differences with respect to projects B, D, E, and F.  The data for project 
B, which is a low risk project, illustrates that fewer participants selected this project in 
the easy budget target condition than in the moderate budget target condition.  
Participants in the moderate budget target condition appear to select project D more often 
than participants in the easy budget target condition.  For products E and F, which are 
both higher risk projects, participants in the easy budget target condition appear more 
likely to select these projects than participants in the moderate budget target condition. 
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TABLE 5.7. Descriptive Statistics for Project Selection 
Panel A: Project Selection by Budget Condition and Period 
  Project Selected  
Period Condition A B C D E F G Total 
1 
Easy 6 2 6 1 1 3 1 20 
Moderate 7 7 2 3 0 0 1 20 
2 
Easy 2 4 4 1 4 4 1 20 
Moderate 6 6 4 2 1 1 0 20 
3 
Easy 5 3 5 2 2 2 1 20 
Moderate 5 7 3 3 1 1 0 20 
4 
Easy 3 4 4 2 2 5 0 20 
Moderate 2 5 4 5 2 0 2 20 
5 
Easy 7 3 4 1 2 2 1 20 
Moderate 5 6 5 2 1 1 0 20 
Total 
Easy 23 16 23 7 11 16 4 100 
Moderate 25 31 18 15 5 3 3 100 
Panel B: Project Selection Variance by Period and Budget Target Condition 
 Project Selection Variance  
Period 
Easy Budget Target 
(s.d.) 
Moderate Budget 
Target (s.d.) 
Total 
(s.d.) p-value 
1 
130,909.15 
(194,343.83) 
93,193.65 
(154,685.51) 
111,551.40 
(173,403.00) 
0.510 
2 
182,242.50 
(197,863.13) 
104,631.80 
(144,309.45) 
143,437.15 
(175,394.06) 
0.165 
3 
125,575.80 
(178,082.08) 
113,608.00 
(151,365.43) 
122,913.33 
(165,836.11) 
0.728 
4 
165,416.75 
(191,944.54) 
200,936.75 
(182,699.37) 
182,676.75 
(185,076.61) 
0.540 
5 
115,325.80 
(180,403.23) 
111,298.45 
(142,533.39) 
113.312.13 
(142,533.39) 
0.938 
Total 
143,894.00 
(186,609.14) 
124,733.70 
(157,506.60) 
134,313.90 
(172,505.30) 
0.217 
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Panel B presents information relating to the variances of the products selected.  
The univariate statistics suggest that there is no statistically significant difference 
between any of the periods or in total for product selection variance.  Product selection 
variance, however, is not consistent across budget target conditions.  In order to maintain 
equal expected values, the variances of the projects presented in the easy budget target 
differed from those in the moderate budget target (see Figure 4.2).  The descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 5.7 Panel B illustrate that on average participants in the easy 
budget target condition selected projects with higher project variances in the first period 
( ̅ = 130,909.15) than participants in the moderate budget target condition ( ̅ = 
93,193.65).  These descriptive statistics provide preliminary evidence that participants in 
the easy budget target condition were willing to take more risk in their project selection 
than participants in the moderate budget target condition.  
 
FIGURE 9. Mean Project Selection Variance over Time 
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5.4 Assumption Testing 
5.4.1 Assumptions for Hypothesis One and Two 
Hypothesis one and two are tested using linear regression.  This section presents 
the analysis of linear regression assumptions.  There are four basic assumptions of linear 
regression: (1) the mean probability distribution of the error term is zero, (2) the error 
term has constant variance for all levels of the independent variables, (3) the probability 
distribution of the error term is normal, and (4) the error terms are independent.   
The first assumption was examined by plotting the residuals versus the 
independent variable, budget condition.  The dependent variable in hypothesis one is 
product selection variance in the first period.  There were no patterns observed in the data 
and the pattern of residuals did not appear to be systematically different between the two 
budget conditions.  Therefore the first assumption is satisfied for hypothesis one.  
For hypothesis two, the dependent variable is the change in reference level from 
period zero to period five.  To assess the probability distribution of the error term, a 
scatterplot of the residuals versus the independent variable, number of times the budget 
target was attained, was examined.  The scatterplot revealed no patterns in the data and 
the pattern of residuals did not appear to be systematically different.  Therefore, the 
assumption of a mean of zero for the error term is satisfied. 
The next assumption is that the error term has a constant variance for all levels of 
the independent variable.  To examine this assumption for both hypothesis one and two a 
scatterplot of the residuals versus the predicted dependent variable values was created.  
For both hypothesis one and two, there appeared to be no patterns which would indicate 
unequal variance detected in the scatterplot.  To further test the assumption of constant 
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variance a Levene‟s test was conducted.  For both hypothesis one and two, the Levene‟s 
test revealed the assumption of constant variance was satisfied (p>0.30). 
The third assumption examined was whether the error term was normally 
distributed.  For both hypothesis one and two a histogram of the residuals was examined.  
The histogram for hypothesis one reveals a violation of this assumption.  Specifically the 
distribution is skewed to the left.  Regression, however, is robust to violations of this 
assumption (Jahan and Khan 2012).  Hypothesis one is tested using equal cell sizes.  
Therefore, even though the assumption of a normally distributed error term is violated for 
hypothesis one, I will rely on the robustness of regression.
53
  The normality assumption 
for hypothesis two appears to be satisfied from examining the histogram of residuals as 
the distribution of the error term appears to be normal. 
The last assumption relates to the independence of the error terms.  For hypothesis 
one, this data is not dependent on time and therefore residual correlation is highly 
unlikely.  The independence of error terms for hypothesis two is more likely, given that 
the dependent variable, change in reference level, is a change score.  The Durbin-Watson 
statistic, however, reveals there is little to no autocorrelation in the error terms (2.111).  A 
Durbin-Watson score of 2.00 indicates no autocorrelation. 
5.4.2 Assumptions for Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three is tested using independent one-sample t-tests.  Before running 
the t-tests an analysis was conducted to determine whether there were any significant 
covariates that must be accounted for.  The analysis, which is fully discussed later in this 
section, revealed that there were no covariates that were significantly correlated with the 
                                                          
53 A non-parametric Mann-Whitley test was conducted as additional analysis of hypothesis one.  The results 
for hypothesis one are qualitatively the same.  
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dependent variable, the change in product selection variance.  Therefore, independent 
one-sample t-tests were conducted. 
There are a number of assumptions of independent small-sample t-tests.  The 
samples being compared should follow a normal distribution, have constant variance, and 
the observations should be independent.  To assess the normal distribution of the 
dependent variable change in product selection, a Shapiro-Wilks test was performed.  The 
results of this test reveal that the dependent variable for hypothesis three is non-normal.  
Therefore, the other assumptions mentioned previously were not analyzed and hypothesis 
three was tested using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, a non-parametric test. 
5.5 Test of Hypotheses 
5.5.1 Test of Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one predicts that participants in the easy budget target condition will 
exhibit more risk taking in the first period than participants in the moderate budget target 
condition.  A regression analysis was conducted to test this hypothesis.  Table 5.8 
presents the results of the regression analysis.  Models one and two are run with the entire 
sample (N = 40) while models three and four are run with only those participants who 
passed the experiment manipulation check (N = 33).  As can be seen, no models are 
significant in the analysis.  Additionally, the coefficient for budget target condition is not 
significant.  Therefore, this test does not provide support for hypothesis one.
54
  
 
 
 
                                                          
54
 One-sample independent t-test have qualitatively similar results, t = 0.679, p = 0.25.  Additionally, non-
parametric tests for differences also have qualitatively similar results, p = 0.16. 
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TABLE 5.8. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis One 
Regression Models of Project Selection Variance: 
Period 1
a 
 
Project Selection Variancet=1 = 0 + 1Budget Target Condition + 2Risk Preference                      
+ 3Loss Aversion + 4Baseline Reference Level + 5Gender + 

 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 1
b 
2
b 
3
c 
4
c 
Model
 
 
 1.631 
(0.188) 
 1.569 
(0.195) 
 1.141 
(0.358) 
 1.216 
(0.329) 
Intercept  0.107 0.199  0.262  0.427 
Independent Variable 
(H1) 
 
    
Budget Target 
Condition
d - 
-0.420  0.227 -0.402  0.307 
Control Variables      
Risk Preference
e 
+ 
     
1.960** 
     
2.053** 
   1.412*    1.458* 
Loss Aversion
f 
- -0.282 -0.381 -0.497 -0.645 
Baseline Reference 
Level
g  
 1.064  1.423  1.064  1.472 
Gender
h 
  -1.127  -1.201 
      
Adjusted R
2
  0.061 0.068 0.017 0.033 
Sample Size  40 40 33 33 
*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects. 
a
 Project Selection Variance: The variance associated with the project that participants selected in period 1.  
A Tobit regression was run and the results are qualitatively the same. 
b 
Full sample of observations. 
c
 Sample includes only those who passed the experiment manipulation check. 
d 
Budget Target Condition: Coded as zero for participants in the easy budget target condition and one for 
those in the moderate budget target condition. 
e
 Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale.  Values range from zero to 
ten.  Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking, lower scores indicate more risk-aversion. 
f
 Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale.  Values range from zero to ten.  
Higher scores indicate more loss aversion.  Lower scores indicate less loss aversion. 
g
 Baseline Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would you 
have neither positive nor negative emotion?”  The baseline reference level was ascertained before the first 
period of the main experiment. 
h
 Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males. 
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Due to the small sample size of the experiment and the differences in product 
selection variance between the budget target conditions, further analysis of hypothesis 
one is warranted.  Referring back to Table 5.7, there was a sizeable difference in the 
product selection variance between the easy ( ̅ = 130,909.15) and moderate ( ̅ = 
93,193.65) budget target conditions. However, the standard deviations relating to the 
means of easy and moderate budget target condition are both larger than the means, 
suggesting large variation in the data, which could impact the statistical tests.   
Therefore, a qualitative analysis of the frequency of the projects selected by 
budget target condition was conducted.  Table 5.9 reports the results of a number of Chi-
Square frequency tests to assess whether the proportion of products selected is different 
between the easy and moderate budget target conditions.  Table 5.9 presents frequency 
tables and Chi-square analysis for hypothesis one. 
Panel A of Table 5.9 presents the results of a Chi-square analysis analyzing each 
project as a separate category.  The overall Chi-Square is not significant (2 = 9.855, p = 
0.13) and the Gamma correlational coefficient (t = -1.283, p = 0.20) is also not 
significant.
55
  This analysis, however, is performed where twelve of the fourteen cells 
(85.7 percent) have expected values less than five, and the minimum count is 0.50.  To 
alleviate some of the expected count concerns, Panel B of Table 5.9 presents a two-by-
two classification.   
  
                                                          
55
 The gamma statistic is preferred over Spearman‟s Rho and Cramer‟s V when working with collapsed 
ordinal data that have a limited number of categories and when data have many tied observations (SAS 
1999).  Gamma is designed to determine how effectively information about an individual‟s ranking in one 
variable is at predicting that individuals ranking in the other variable.  The gamma statistic computes the 
level of association between two variables. 
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TABLE 5.9. Full Sample Frequency Distribution and Chi-Square Analysis
a
 
Panel A: All Projects Included as Categories
b
 
Project 
Easy 
Budget 
Target 
Moderate 
Budget 
Target Total 
Chi-Square 
Value 
(significance)
c
 
Gamma 
(significance)
d 
A 6 7 13 
9.855 
(0.13) 
-0.274 
(0.20) 
B 2 7 9 
C 6 2 8 
D 1 3 4 
E 1 0 1 
F 3 0 3 
G 1 1 2 
Panel B: Projects Split into Two Categories (A, B, C) and (E, F, G)
e
 
Category 
Easy 
Budget 
Target 
Moderate 
Budget 
Target Total 
Chi-Square 
Value 
(significance)
c
 
Gamma 
(significance)
d 
Less Risk 
(A, B, C) 
14 16 30 
2.697 
(0.11) 
-0.702 
(0.08) More Risk 
(E, F, G) 
5 1 6 
Panel C: Projects Split into Three Categories (A, B), (C, D, E) and (F, G)
f
 
Category 
Easy 
Budget 
Target 
Moderate 
Budget 
Target Total 
Chi-Square 
Value 
(significance)
c
 
Gamma 
(significance)
d 
Low Risk 
(A, B) 
8 14 22 
4.129 
(0.13) 
-0.541 
(0.03) 
Moderate Risk 
(C, D, E) 
8 5 13 
High Risk 
(F, G) 
4 1 5 
*, **, ***
 Two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
+, ++, +++
 One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a
 Analysis with only those who passed the manipulation check are generally the same.  Results for Panel 
B become insignificant at p = 0.14.  This is most likely due to the decreased sample size and less 
statistical power.  Results for Panel C are similar ( = -1.847, 0.06). 
b
 85.7% of the products contain expected counts less than five.  The minimum count is 0.50. 
c
 Chi-Square value is two-tailed and cannot be divided because the distribution is not symmetric.   
d
 A correlational coefficient related to a directional prediction and is presented as a one-tailed significance 
level.  Tests the correlation between budget target condition and project risk selection.  The approximate 
T-statistic is not reported in the table. 
e 
To get an approximate Chi-Square, created a 2 X 2 frequency table.  Classified projects A, B, and C as 
less risk and projects E, F, G as more risk.  Enables a Fischer‟s Exact test.  The significance of the Chi-
Square is the Fischer‟s exact test statistic. 
f
 Created smaller groups to alleviate some issues with expected counts.  Classified projects A and B as 
low risk, projects C, D, and E as moderate risk, and projects F and G as high risk.  Only 33.3% of the 
cells had expected counts less than five.  The minimum count is 2.5.
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A two-by-two classification allows for a Fischer‟s Chi-square exact test, which 
does not take into account expected cell counts.  The classifications divided projects into 
two groups, less risk and more risk.  Projects A, B, and C were classified as less risk 
while projects E, F, and G were classified as more risk.  The Chi-square is not significant 
(2 = 2.697, p = 0.11) but the Gamma correlational coefficient is marginally significant (t 
= -1.760, p = 0.08).  The Gamma correlational coefficient measures the correlation 
between the two variables in a contingency table.  In Panel B of Table 5.9, the negative 
Gamma indicates that more risky projects are more likely to be selected by participants in 
the easy budget target condition, rather than the moderate budget target condition. 
Panel C of Table 5.9 presents a split of the projects that incorporates all of the 
available projects.  Projects A and B are classified as low risk, projects C, D, and E are 
classified as moderate risk, and projects F and G are classified as high risk.  The overall 
Chi-square is not significant (2 = 4.129, p = 0.13) but the Gamma correlational 
coefficient is statistically significant (t = -2.172, p = 0.03).  This again suggests that as 
project risk increases, participants in the easy budget target are more likely to select 
higher risk projects than participants in the moderate budget target condition.  The results 
of Panel B and Panel C of Table 5.9 both provide partial support for hypothesis one.
56
 
Given the results of the regression analysis, combined with the evidence presented 
in Table 5.9, there is mixed support for hypothesis one.  The regression results, reported 
using a quantitative dependent variable, project selection variance, revealed no 
statistically significant differences between easy and moderate budget target conditions.  
This test followed prior literature that relied on project variance as a measure of risk (e.g., 
                                                          
56 The classifications of projects presented are the most logical classifications.  Classifying projects based 
on other specifications generally provide qualitatively similar results.   
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Chow et al. 2007).  The Chi-square analysis suggests that participants in the easy budget 
target condition are more likely to select a more risky project than participants in the 
moderate budget target condition, consistent with SP|A predictions.  This analysis is 
similar to what was conducted by Sprinkle et al. (2008), who created classifications of the 
projects presented to compare projects selected by participants.  Based on the above 
analysis, there is mixed support for hypothesis one. 
5.5.2 Test of Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two predicts that participants who continually attain their budget 
target will exhibit a greater change in their reference level than those who do not 
continually attain their budget target.  To test this hypothesis a regression analysis was 
conducted.  The bivariate correlations for the variables included in the model are 
presented in Table 5.10.   
The independent variable, attained budget target, is significantly correlated with 
the dependent variable, change in reference level.  Additionally, the covariates loss 
aversion and gender are also significantly correlated with the dependent variable.  
Although risk preference and attained budget target period 4 and period 5 are not 
correlated with the dependent variable, they are left in the model because they were 
predicted to affect the level of reference level change.  As shown in Table 5.10, there are 
no concerns for multicollinearity.  None of the independent variables are highly 
correlated with other independent variables above.  Specifically, the highest correlation 
between the independent variable, attained budget target, and a control variable, attained 
budget target in period five is 0.41 (p = 0.02).   
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TABLE 5.10. Bivariate Correlations for Hypothesis Two 
Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Regression Models of Change in Reference Level* 
Variable 
Change in 
Reference Level 
Attained 
Budget Target 
Risk 
Preference 
Loss 
Aversion 
Attained Budget 
Target Period 4 
Attained Budget 
Target Period 5 Gender 
Change in Reference Level
a 
1.00 
0.36 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
-0.26 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.79) 
0.15 
(0.39) 
-0.33 
(0.06) 
Times Attained Budget Target
b 0.38 
(0.03) 
1.00 
-0.07 
(0.71) 
0.09 
(0.61) 
0.37 
(0.04) 
0.38 
(0.03) 
-0.33 
(0.07) 
Risk Preference
c 0.01 
(0.96) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
1.00 
-0.15 
(0.40) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.91) 
0.10 
(0.59) 
Loss Aversion
d -0.46 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
0.08 
(0.67) 
1.00 
0.14 
(0.44) 
-0.05 
(0.77) 
-0.13 
(0.47) 
Attained Budget Target Period 
4
e 
0.04 
(0.82) 
0.36 
(0.04) 
0.30 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
1.00 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
-0.25 
(0.17) 
Attained Budget Target Period 5
f 0.16 
(0.38) 
0.41 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.93) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
1.00 
-0.10 
(0.60) 
Gender
g -0.31 
(0.08) 
-0.284 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.78) 
0.06 
(0.73) 
-0.246 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.60) 
1.00 
* Pearson correlation statistics are reported above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are reported below the diagonal.  Two-tailed p-values are in the 
parentheses. 
a Change in Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?”  This question was 
answered before the first period of the main experiment and every period thereafter, up to period 5.  Change in Reference Level in this table is the difference in responses to the 
aforementioned question between period 5 and period 0. 
b Times Attained Budget Target: A count variable that counts the number of times an individual attained the budget target up to period 5.  Values range as follows (number of 
participants): three (four), four (eight), and five (twenty-one). 
c Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale.  Values range from zero to ten.  Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking, lower scores indicate 
more risk-aversion. 
d Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale.  Values range from zero to ten.  Higher scores indicate more loss aversion.  Lower scores indicate less 
loss aversion. 
e Attained Budget Target Period 4: Coded as 0 if the participant missed the budget target in period four and 1 if the participant attained the budget target in period four. 
f Attained Budget Target Period 5: Coded as 0 if the participant missed the budget target in period five and 1 if the participant attained the budget target in period five. 
g Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males. 
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The means for change in reference level from period zero to period five are 
presented in Table 5.11.  The means are presented based on the number of times a 
participant attained the budget target.
  
As expected, participants who attained the budget 
target three times show a mean change in reference level of 17,500 while participants 
who attained the budget target four times show a mean change of 21,125.  Both of these 
amount appear to be significantly lower than the mean change of 93,333.33 for 
participants who attained the budget target in every period.  There is a moderately 
significant difference between the three groups (F = 2.601, p = 0.09).      
 
TABLE 5.11. Change in Reference Level by Number of Times the Budget Target was 
Attained 
Change in Reference Level 
 Number of Times Attained   
 Three 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Four 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Five 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Total 
(s.d.) 
[n] p - value 
Mean 
17,500 
(88,835.05) 
[4] 
21,125.00 
(45,272.00) 
[8] 
93,333.33 
(97,805.08) 
[21] 
67,121.21 
(91,702.90) 
[33] 
0.09 
 
 
 
The regression models for hypothesis two are presented in Table 5.12.  In all four 
models, the coefficient on Times Attained Budget Target is positive and statistically 
significant (one-tailed p < 0.05).
57
  The positive, significant coefficient indicates that the 
more times a participant attains the budget target, the greater the change in their reference 
level.  This suggests the more times an individual attains the budget target, the greater 
                                                          
57
 Results for hypothesis two are qualitatively similar when Times Attained Budget Target is coded as a 
dichotomous variable.  Variable coded as one for those who attained the budget target every period and 
zero for those who missed the budget target at least once. 
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their expectations of future economic outcomes.  This relationship remains when Gender 
is added into the model.  Therefore, Table 5.12 provides support for hypothesis two.
58
   
Additional analysis in models three and four analyze whether there is a recency 
effect whereby individuals take into account whether they have attained the budget target 
in the two most recent periods and whether there is an impact on the change in reference 
level.  Although this effect is not hypothesized, the analysis was conducted to ensure the 
change in reference level was not caused by the most recent period‟s outcome.  As can be 
seen in Table 5.12 there does not appear to be a recency effect. Overall, the results 
reported provide support for hypothesis two.
59
  
5.5.3 Test of Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three predicts that participants who continually attain the budget target 
will exhibit less risking taking after multiple periods than they did in the initial period.  
This prediction is based on SP|A theory, in which increases in a participant‟s reference 
level would suggest that fewer risky projects allow for the attainment of their aspiration 
level.  Therefore, in order to guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level, participants 
will have to select from less risky projects.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Additional analysis identified two outliers in the sample.  The results for hypothesis two are qualitatively 
the same without these observations included in the sample.  Results are presented with the observations 
kept in the sample. 
59 Results for hypothesis two are qualitatively similar when the quantitative economic outcomes from 
period four and period five are used in place of the dichotomous variables attained budget target period four 
and period five. 
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TABLE 5.12. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis Two  
Regression Models of Change in Reference Level: 
Period 5 compared to Period 0
a 
 
Change in Reference Level = 0 + 1Times Attained Budget Target + 2Risk 
Preference                      + 3Loss Aversion + 4Attained Budget Target in Period 4                                                           
+ 5 Attained Budget Target in Period 5 + 6 Gender + 

 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 1 2 3 4 
Model
b 
  (Significance)
c  
2.656
 
(0.067)
 
2.759 
(0.047) 
1.526 
(0.215) 
1.817 
(0.135) 
Intercept  -1.236 -0.483 -1.105 -0.313 
Independent Variable 
(H2) 
 
    
Times Attained Budget 
Target
d + 
2.336*** 1.771** 2.060** 1.743** 
Control Variables      
Risk Preference  0.060 0.170 0.187 0.388 
Loss Aversion  -1.766
+ 
-1.960
+
 -1.630 -1.791
+ 
Attained Budget 
Target- P4 
 
  -0.081 -0.682 
Attained Budget 
Target- P5 
 
  -0.031 -0.204 
Gender   -1.620  -1.664 
      
Adjusted R
2
  0.134 0.18 0.076 0.133 
Sample Size  33 33 33 33 
*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects. 
+
, 
++
, 
+++
 Two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a
 Change in Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would 
you have neither positive nor negative emotion?”  This question was answered before the first period of 
the main experiment began and every period thereafter, up to period 5.  Change in Reference Level in this 
table is the difference in responses to the aforementioned question between period 5 and period 0. 
b 
Sample includes only those who passed the experiment manipulation check.  Results are qualitatively 
different for the entire sample.  Those who passed the manipulation check had significantly different 
values for change in reference level than those who did not pass the manipulation check (F = 3.097, p = 
0.09).  Therefore, this analysis only includes those who passed the manipulation check question. 
c
 P-value relating to the significance of the model. 
d
 Times Attained Budget Target: Count variable equal to the number of times an individual has attained 
the budget target up to period 5.  Values range as follows (number of participants): three (four), four 
(eight) and five (twenty-one). 
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Before testing this hypothesis, an analysis of a priori control variables is 
performed.  Specifically, I analyze whether any control variables are significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable.  The correlations are presented in Table 5.13.  
The correlation table reveals that none of the a priori covariates are significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable change in project selection.  Economic outcome 
period 4 is not significantly correlated based on Pearson correlation, but is based on the 
Spearman correlation.  For this variable, which is continuous, the Pearson correlation is a 
more appropriate correlation to analyze.  Based on the correlation table, the test for 
hypothesis three will be a series of one-sample t-tests assessing whether the change in 
project selection variance is different than zero in the negative direction. 
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TABLE 5.13. Bivariate Correlations for Hypothesis Three 
Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Regression Models of  
Change in Project Selection* 
Variable 
Change in 
Project Selection 
Variance 
Risk 
Preference 
Loss 
Aversion 
Reference Level 
Period 4 
Future 
Expectation 
Period 4 
Economic 
Outcome Period 4 Gender 
Change in Project Selection 
Variance
a 1 
0.113 
(0.60) 
-0.57 
(0.79) 
-0.122 
(0.57) 
-0.207 
(0.33) 
-0.333 
(0.11) 
0.204 
(0.34) 
Risk Preference
b -0.061 
(0.78) 
1 
-0.287 
(0.17) 
0.108 
(0.62) 
0.159 
(0.46) 
-0.225 
(0.29) 
-0.061 
(0.78) 
Loss Aversion
c 0.106 
(0.62) 
-0.130 
(0.55) 
1 
-0.141 
(0.51) 
-0.188 
(0.38) 
-0.197 
(0.36) 
-0.154 
(0.47) 
Reference Level Period 4
d -0.198 
(0.35) 
0.105 
(0.62) 
-0.183 
(0.39) 
1 
0.377 
(0.07) 
-0.101 
(0.64) 
-0.314 
(0.14) 
Future Expectations Period 
4
e 
0.105 
(0.63) 
0.448 
(0.03) 
-0.150 
(0.48) 
0.281 
(0.18) 
1 
-0.125 
(0.56) 
-0.069 
(0.75) 
Economic Outcome Period 
4
f 
-0.378 
(0.07) 
-0.207 
(0.33) 
-0.122 
(0.57) 
-0.182 
(0.39) 
-0.148 
(0.49) 
1 
0.134 
(0.53) 
Gender
g 0.223 
(0.30) 
-0.087 
(0.69) 
-0.141 
(0.51) 
-0.310 
(0.14) 
-0.025 
(0.91) 
-0.151 
(0.48) 
1 
*
 Pearson correlation statistics are reported above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are reported below the diagonal.  
Two-tailed p-values are in the parentheses. 
a
 Change in Product Selection Variance: Difference in project selection variance from period five to period one. 
b
 Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale.  Values range from zero to ten.  Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking, 
lower scores indicate more risk-aversion. 
c 
Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale.  Values range from zero to ten.  Higher scores indicate more loss aversion.  
Lower scores indicate less loss aversion. 
d
 Reference Level Period 4: The reference level reported after period four.  Answer to the question: “At what level of payment would you have neither 
positive nor negative emotion?” 
e
 Future Expectations Period 4: Answer to the question: “What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next period will be?”  Answered at 
the end of period 4. 
f
 Economic Outcome Period 4: The actual economic outcome of the project selected in period 4, expressed in Lira. 
g
 Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males. 
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TABLE 5.14. Descriptive Statistics for Change in Project Selection Variance
a
 
Panel A: Change in Project Selection Variance by Attained Budget Target
b 
and Budget 
Target Condition: Full Sample 
 Number of Times the Budget Target was Attained  
 Three 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Four 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Five 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Total 
(s.d.) 
[N] 
Easy Budget 
Target 
Condition
c
 
-441,667.00 
(N/A) 
[1] 
1,000 
(74,381.77) 
[5] 
10,357.14 
(47,856.53) 
[14] 
-14,583.35 
(113,375.68) 
[20] 
Moderate 
Budget Target 
Condition 
-75,714.25 
(151,428.50) 
[4] 
68,047.83 
(285,047.40) 
[6] 
25,666.60 
(54,212.52) 
[10] 
18,104.80 
(170,486.69) 
[20] 
Panel B: Change in Project Selection Variance by Attained Budget Target and Budget 
Target Condition: Only Participants who Passed the Manipulation Check 
 Number of Times the Budget Target was 
Attained 
 
 Three 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Four 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Five 
(s.d.) 
[n] 
Total 
(s.d.) 
[N] 
Easy Budget 
Target 
Condition
c
 
-441,667.00 
(N/A) 
[1] 
1,000.00 
(74,381.77) 
[5] 
11,153.85 
(49,713.93) 
[13] 
-15,350.89 
(116,429.04) 
[19] 
Moderate 
Budget Target 
Condition 
0.00 
(0.00) 
[3] 
-90,656.67 
(280,528.36) 
[3] 
32,708.25 
(59,106.54) 
[8] 
-736.00 
(128,618.20) 
[14] 
 
a
 Tests of hypothesis three relate only to those who attained the budget target in every period. 
b 
Attained Budget Target: Count variable equal to the number of times an individual has attained the 
budget target up to period 5.  
c
 Change in Project Selection: Difference between the variances in the project selected in period five 
versus the project selected in period one
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable change in project selection 
variance are presented in Table 5.14.  The statistics indicate that there are differences in 
project selection variance between the easy and moderate budget target conditions.  This 
could be partially due to the differences in project selection variance between the budget 
target conditions.  Therefore, tests of hypothesis three are conducted for the entire 
sample, the easy budget target condition, and the moderate budget target condition.  
Hypothesis three is tested using only the participants who continually attained their 
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budget target.  Therefore, only those who attained the budget target five times are 
included in the statistical analysis.  As can be seen in Table 5.14, the change in project 
selection variance for those who attained the budget target in every period is positive, 
which is opposite of what hypothesis three predicted.  The positive change in project 
selection variance appears to not support SP|A theory predictions about risk taking 
behavior. 
To further analyze the prior assessment, Table 5.15 presents the tests of 
hypothesis three.  The tests presented are Wilcoxon signed rank tests because the 
assumption of normality is violated.  The results presented provide no support for 
hypothesis three.  On the contrary, the results suggest an opposite effect than what was 
theorized.  Hypothesis three was based on behavioral predictions of SP|A theory.  
However, the results suggest that participants behaved in accordance with prospect theory 
predictions.   
Prospect theory would predict that as individuals reference levels increase, more 
projects would be perceived in a loss frame.  Increasing reference levels would mean that 
more projects place the attainment of the budget target in jeopardy.  Therefore, more 
projects would be viewed as possible loses because individuals would have a greater 
chance of missing the budget target.  Thusly, prospect theory predicts that individuals in a 
loss frame tend to make more risk-seeking decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Chow et al. 2007).  The results presented in Table 5.15 tend to support this prediction.  
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Statistical tests to support this assertion, however, are not significant using Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests.
60
 
The results presented in Table 5.15 do not provide support for hypothesis three.  
Specifically, the prediction based on SP|A theory is not supported.  To analyze whether 
individuals followed the process proposed by SP|A theory, supplemental analysis will 
examine which projects participants eliminated in each period prior to making their 
project selections. 
 
 
TABLE 5.15. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests for Hypothesis Three 
Panel A: Full Sample of Participants Who Attained Budget Target in Every Period 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Z-Score 
Asymptotic 
Significance
a
 
All 
observations 
24 16,736.08 50,039.72 -0.905  0.36 
Easy Only 14 10,357.14 47,856.53 0.000 1.00 
Moderate Only 10 25,666.60 54,212.52 -1.190 0.23 
a
 Two-tailed significance level.   
  
  
5.6 Supplemental Analysis: Project Elimination 
During each time period in the experiment participants were asked to eliminate 
projects from consideration if they felt they would not consider them when making the 
final project selection.  This experimental procedure provided insights into the process 
through which participants made their risky decisions.  Table 5.16 presents the 
                                                          
60 The assertion is supported using parametric two-sample t-tests.  The results, however, should be 
interpreted with caution.   For the entire sample (n=24) [n = 21], p-value = 0.06 [0.05] there is marginal 
statistical significance.  For the easy budget target condition (n = 14) [n = 13], there is no support for either 
SP|A or Prospect Theory. For the moderate budget target condition (n = 10) [n = 8], there is a marginally 
significant effect (p = 0.08) [p = 0.08]. 
99 
 
TABLE 5.16. Projects Eliminated from Consideration by Budget Target Condition and Period 
 Products Eliminated 
Period 
Budget Target 
Condition
a
 A B C D E F G None 
1 
Easy 
2 
(10%) 
2 
(10%) 
2 
(10%) 
4 
(20%) 
4 
(20%) 
10 
(50%) 
17 
(85%) 
1 
(5%) 
Moderate 
3 
(15%) 
1 
(5%) 
6 
(30%) 
4 
(20%) 
12 
(60%) 
14 
(70%) 
16 
(80%) 
2 
(10%) 
 
2 
Easy 
5 
(25%) 
4 
(20%) 
4 
(20%) 
5 
(25%) 
4 
(20%) 
10 
(50%) 
16 
(80%) 
1 
(5%) 
Moderate 
4 
(20%) 
3 
(15%) 
7 
(35%) 
7 
(35%) 
10 
(50%) 
14 
(70%) 
17 
(85%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
3 
Easy 
2 
(10%) 
4 
(20%) 
3 
(15%) 
5 
(25%) 
5 
(25%) 
14 
(70%) 
18 
(90%) 
1 
(5%) 
Moderate 
2 
(10%) 
2 
(10%) 
7 
(35%) 
10 
(50%) 
12 
(60%) 
14 
(70%) 
18 
(90%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
4 
Easy 
5 
(25%) 
4 
(20%) 
4 
(20%) 
5 
(25%) 
5 
(25%) 
14 
(70%) 
16 
(80%) 
1 
(5%) 
Moderate 
3 
(15%) 
2 
(10%) 
7 
(35%) 
7 
(35%) 
13 
(65%) 
13 
(65%) 
17 
(85%) 
1 
(5%) 
 
5 
Easy 
3 
(15%) 
3 
(15%) 
2 
(10%) 
6 
(30%) 
6 
(30%) 
15 
(75%) 
16 
(80%) 
1 
(5%) 
Moderate 
4 
(20%) 
4 
(20%) 
6 
(30%) 
6 
(30%) 
12 
(60%) 
14 
(70%) 
19 
(95%) 
0 
(0%) 
a
 There are twenty participants in the easy budget target condition and twenty participants in the moderate budget 
target condition. 
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descriptive statistics for this data.  SP|A predicts that individuals eliminate alternatives 
from consideration that place their aspiration level in jeopardy.  If SP|A correctly 
specifies the process that individuals follow, then I would expect there to be a difference 
in which projects participants eliminated between budget target conditions.   
In both conditions, projects F and G did not allow for guaranteed attainment of 
the budget target, thusly placing the attainment of the aspiration level in jeopardy.  
Therefore, I would expect no differences between the two budget target conditions.  
Projects C, D, and E, however, are different between the budget target conditions.  
Specifically, in the moderate budget target condition projects C, D, and E do not allow 
for the guaranteed attainment of the budget target whereas in the easy budget target 
condition they do.  To examine whether participants project elimination depended upon 
their budget target condition, a series of 2 X 2 contingency tables were examined to 
assess whether there is a significant difference in which projects were eliminated by 
budget condition.   
For each 2 X 2 contingency table, budget target was one of the variables.  The 
other variable was the number of projects eliminated.  For example, in period one, project 
A would be examined to assess if there was a difference in the probability of dropping 
that project by budget target condition.  This analysis would continue until period five, 
project G.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.17.  The a priori 
expectations were that the probability of dropping projects C, D, and E would be different 
between budget target conditions.  The expectation is that participants in the moderate 
budget target condition will eliminate these projects more than participants in the easy 
budget target condition because these projects place the reference level in jeopardy in the 
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moderate budget target condition.  Projects C, D, and E are the projects that differ 
between budget target conditions in terms of whether or not they guarantee the attainment 
of the budget target.
61
    
The results presented in Table 5.17 suggest that participants in the moderate 
budget target condition were more likely to eliminate Project E in every period compared 
to participants in the easy budget target condition, providing some support for SP|A 
predictions.  Results for Project C and Project D, however, are not significant and do not 
provide support for SP|A predictions.  Therefore, the supplemental analysis suggests that 
participants do eliminate projects differently based on their reference levels, but the data 
do not support all a priori expectations.
                                                          
61 Analysis with only those participants who passed the manipulation check has slightly different results.  
All relationships presented in Table 5.17 remain.  Some additional significant differences are found 
however.  Period one, project C (2 = 3.060, 0.09), period three, project D (2 = 4.758, 0.03), period five, 
project C (2 = 3.060, 0.09), and period five, project G (2 = 3.354, 0.09). 
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TABLE 5.17. Contingency Tables for Project Elimination
a, b
  
Variable Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
 
Period 5 
ProjectA
c 
0.229 0.143 0.000 0.625 0.173 
ProjectB
d 
0.360 0.173 0.784 0.784 0.173 
ProjectC
e 
2.500 1.129 2.133 1.129 2.500 
ProjectD
f 
0.000 0.476 2.667* 0.476 0.000 
ProjectE
g 
6.667** 3.956** 5.013** 6.465** 3.636* 
ProjectF
h 
1.667 1.667 0.000 0.114 0.125 
ProjectG
i 
0.173 0.173 0.000 0.173 2.057 
      
Sample Size 40 40 40 40 40 
*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a
 The table presents Chi-square statistics. Significance related to Fischer‟s Exact Test.  Significance presented is 
Fischer Exact Test one-sided.  
b
 Budget Condition: Coded as a zero for easy budget target condition and a one for moderate budget target 
condition. 
c
ProjectA: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project A. 
d
ProjectB: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project B. 
e
ProjectC: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project C. 
f
ProjectD: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project D. 
g
ProjectE: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project E. 
h
ProjectF: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project F. 
i
ProjectG: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project G. 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
Prior research in risky decision making in single-period settings has not provided 
a definitive answer relating to how budget targets should be set in order to increase 
employee risk-taking behaviors.  Chow et al. (2007) find that difficult budget targets lead 
to more risk-taking behavior than easy budget targets.  Sprinkle et al. (2008), however, 
find that easy budget targets lead to more risk-seeking behavior than more difficult 
budget targets.  This study provides additional evidence in this line of research.  
Specifically, the results from this study suggest that individuals make more risk-seeking 
decisions under easy budget targets compared to moderate budget targets when analyzing 
the initial project selection period.   
Prior field studies have suggested that many organizations use moderate to easily 
achievable targets in budget-based contracts (Merchant and Manzoni 1989).  Although 
subsequent field research has failed to provide an in-depth analysis of budget target level, 
it is believed that moderate budget targets, rather than difficult budget targets, are used by 
many organizations and the use of moderate budget targets is suggested by prior research 
(Van der Stede 2000; Fisher et al. 2003).  Therefore, organizations utilizing moderate 
budget targets should be aware of the evidence provided in this study that moderate 
budget targets lead to less risk-taking than easy budget targets. 
104 
 
This result is supported by security-potential/aspiration level theory, which 
proposes that individuals with easy budget targets have more options that allow the 
guaranteed attainment of their reference level (Lopes 1987, 1990; Lopes and Oden 1999).  
Once individuals are guaranteed their reference level can be attained, their attention then 
focuses on the remaining alternative(s) that gives the highest potential payoff, which will 
lead them to select riskier alternatives.  Under moderate budget targets, fewer alternatives 
guarantee the attainment of the reference level and therefore, many riskier alternatives are 
eliminated from consideration, thus leading to less risk-taking behavior.   
The aforementioned result suggests firms that want their employees to take more 
risks should utilize easy budget targets, compared to moderate budget targets.  By doing 
so, firms can encourage employees to make more risky decisions.  The results also 
suggest that firms using moderate budget targets may be stifling employees‟ risk-taking 
behavior through the setting of their budget target difficulty.  Specifically, the results of 
this study suggest that individuals with moderate budget targets make less risky decisions 
than those with easy budget targets. 
This study also provides empirical evidence that individuals‟ reference levels 
change over time.  Prior research in decision making generally analyzes single period 
settings, in which individuals reference levels are assumed to be fixed and set based on 
exogenous factors, such as contract parameters (Wakker 2010).  Although this 
assumption may be true in single period settings, researchers have acknowledged that 
individuals reference levels are not set and tend to change over time (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, 1992).  This study provides evidence consistent with the assertion.  
Specifically, the empirical evidence suggests that reference levels do change over time, 
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and the magnitude of the change in reference levels is dependent upon the number of 
times the budget target was attained.  This suggests that the change in reference level is 
dependent upon individuals‟ expectations of future economic outcomes because those 
who continually attained the budget target received higher levels of economic payments. 
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences theory suggests that 
reference levels are at least in part determined based on rational expectations (Koszegi 
and Rabin 2006).  This study applies this theory and extends it by examining whether 
expectations of future economic outcomes play a role in determining individuals‟ 
reference levels.  The results provide evidence that individuals‟ who continually attain 
their budget target, and thus would have higher economic expectations, have a greater 
increase in the reference level than individuals who miss their budget target at least once.  
More specifically, the evidence suggests there is a positive relationship between the 
number of times the budget target was attained and the resulting change in reference 
level.  This finding provides evidence that expectations of future economic outcomes do 
play a role in determining individuals‟ reference levels.   
Although the findings of this study provide evidence that individuals under easy 
budget targets tend to make more risky decisions, the results relating to reference levels 
suggest firms should be aware that easy budget targets may lead to greater changes in 
employee reference levels.  Specifically, when employees begin to expect they will 
receive their base pay plus some form of bonus, they are more likely to increase their 
reference level.  Most decision making theories suggest that individuals‟ reference levels 
plays a vital role in decision making.  Therefore, theoretically, changes in reference level 
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should impact individual decision making, possibly impacting the effectiveness of an 
incentive compensation contract.   
To counteract changes in reference levels, firms should continually assess their 
budget target levels to ensure that employees are not beginning to expect they will 
receive a bonus or high levels of variable pay.  Budget based contracts are very effective 
at focusing employee attention to specific goals embedded in the contract and are 
designed to aid in directing employee actions that are desirable for the firm (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992; Fisher et al. 2008).  Based on the empirical evidence in this study, firms 
should ensure that the goals embedded in their budget based contracts are not too easy, 
whereby employees‟ begin to expect the receipt of their bonus, which would result in 
greater changes in reference levels.  Therefore, firms must weigh the difference between 
expected behavior, more risk-seeking, and future expected behaviors, related to changes 
in reference levels, to ensure that their budget based contract is having the desired effect 
on employee behavior.   
Decision-making theories suggest that reference levels play a large role in how 
individuals make decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987, 1990).  Both 
security-potential/aspiration level theory and prospect theory emphasize the importance 
of the reference level in decision making.  The results of this study, however, do not 
support this assertion.  Specifically, although individuals who attained the budget target 
every period exhibited a significant increase in their reference level, there was no 
significant difference in their decision making corresponding to the increase in reference 
level.  Based solely on this result, firms may not have to be as concerned with changes in 
reference level as there does not appear to be any significant change in behavior related 
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to the change in reference level.  This result should be interpreted with caution, however, 
as prior empirical work and decision making theories suggest that reference levels play a 
vital role in individual decision making. 
There could be a number of reasons why individuals‟ decision making did not 
change in response to changes in reference level.  First, individuals viewed the same 
projects every period for five periods.  Although the order of the projects was controlled 
for, individuals could have become familiar with the projects and therefore continued to 
select the same or similar projects, on average.  Therefore, no change in project selection 
variance could be a result of fixation by participants on particular projects.  Second, 
although there is a documented change in reference level, the magnitude of the change in 
reference level may not have been great enough to warrant significant changes in 
decision making.   Third, it may take more than a few periods for changes in decision 
making to catch up to changes in reference levels.  It is possible there is a significant lag 
between changes in reference levels and changes in decision making behavior.   
Another possibility is related to the statistical analysis of changes in project 
selection.  The sample size used to test for changes in project selection were relatively 
small and more importantly, the standard deviations of the sample tested were three times 
larger than the mean of the sample.  This indicates there was significant variance in the 
data, which could impact the statistical analysis.  Therefore, the power of the statistical 
test is questionable, as very large standard deviations compared to the mean could lead to 
erroneous conclusions.  Lastly, the literature relating to reference levels and capturing 
individuals‟ reference levels is new and still developing.  Therefore, the measure used to 
capture reference was a single question.  Although I believe this measure captured 
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individuals‟ reference levels, it may not have captured them completely.  Therefore, there 
is the possibility there is a significant amount of noise in the reference level measure, 
which could have led to the result that changes in reference level do not impact decision 
making.   
Supplemental analysis suggests that individuals partially follow security-
potential/aspiration level theory predictions relating to the elimination of alternatives.  
Security-potential/aspiration level theory suggests that individuals eliminate alternatives 
from consideration that place their aspiration level in jeopardy.  The supplemental 
analysis shows that individuals making decisions under a moderate budget target were 
more likely to eliminate a particular project, Project E, compared to individuals making 
decisions under an easy budget target.  All a priori expectations, however, were not 
found in this analysis.  The supplemental analysis and other results from the experiment 
suggest that individuals do consider attaining the budget target to be very important.
62
  
However, the elimination of projects does not provide overwhelming support for the 
decision making process proposed by security-potential/aspiration level theory.   
Overall, this research applied relatively new theories to the accounting literature.  
By examining how reference levels are determined, this study opens the door to new 
research examining how changing reference levels impact contract design.  Applying 
expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, this study finds that expectations of 
future economic outcomes play a role in determining reference levels.  Additionally, this 
study extends prior work applying security-potential/aspiration level theory by extending 
prior findings and making predictions about longitudinal behavior in a budgeting setting.  
                                                          
62
 Participants indicated that the budget target was important to them in the post-experimental questionnaire 
( ̅ = 7.93).  The question was answered on a 9-point Likert scale. 
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The results of the study provide partial support for security-potential/aspiration level 
theory predictions. 
This research examined how individuals‟ reference levels change over time and 
whether changes in reference level impact decision making behavior.  The results of the 
study provide evidence that individuals reference levels change over time but this change 
did not significantly impact individuals‟ decision making.  This area of research is ripe 
with ideas to investigate how different types of compensation contracts effect 
individuals‟ reference levels and how shifting reference levels impact incentive contract 
deign and effectiveness. 
6.2 Contributions 
The major contribution of this study is that I find evidence that reference levels 
change over time and that individuals expectations play a vital role in the determination 
of reference levels.  Individuals develop expectations of future economic outcomes, 
based on prior outcomes, and these expectations are used in setting reference levels.  This 
finding contributes to the literature relating to decision making as well as literature 
relating to reference levels.  Research in decision making utilizing budget based contracts 
is limited, and this study provides additional evidence that individuals making decisions 
under easy budget targets tend to make riskier decisions than individuals under moderate 
budget targets when risk and economic payments are the only consideration.  
Additionally, this study provides evidence that expectations of future economic outcomes 
play an important role in setting individual‟s reference level over time. 
Another contribution is the application of expectations-based reference-dependent 
preferences in the accounting literature.  Prior to the introduction of expectations-based 
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reference-dependent preferences, there was a lack of theory that specified how 
individuals formulated their reference level.  Most prior research assumed reference 
levels were set based on exogenous factors, such as contract parameters (Wakker 2010).  
Prior research in accounting suggests that management accounting practices can be an 
important influence on individuals‟ reference levels (Birnberg et al. 2007).  For example, 
budget targets set by management can be used by employees to set their reference level.  
This study links the idea of expectations as a vital aspect in the formulation of reference 
levels and financial economic outcomes. 
This study also applies security-potential/aspiration level theory.  This theory has 
seldom been applied in accounting although its implications for accounting are extensive 
(Sprinkle et al. 2008).  Most prior accounting studies analyzing decision making apply 
prospect theory to examine individual behavior.  Although prospect theory has been 
validated, it does not predict the process of individual decision making, only the decision 
that will be made.  Security-potential/aspiration level theory explicates not only the 
decision that individuals will make but also the process they go through to get to the 
decision (Lopes 1990).  Therefore, this study attempted to understand not only the 
decisions that individuals made but the process they took to reach that decision.    
These findings have practical application for firms using budget based contracts.  
First, firms that want their employees to take more risk should consider utilizing easy 
budget targets, rather than moderate budget targets.  Firms use incentive contracts to 
direct employee behavior.  By using easy budget targets firms would be able to increase 
employee risk taking, thus creating goal congruence between the behaviors of their 
employees and the goals of the firm. 
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Second, firms should be aware that employees‟ reference levels change over time, 
which could possibly impact employee behaviors.  Although the results of this study do 
not support this contention, almost all theories relating to decision making specify that 
reference levels impact individual decision making.  Based on this theoretical argument, 
firms should be cognizant of possible changes in reference levels and continually review 
their incentive compensation contracts to ensure employees are exhibiting the desired 
behavior.  In addition, firms should understand that changes in employee behavior could 
be a result of changes in reference levels.  Firms design incentive compensation contracts 
to direct employee behaviors.  It is possible that changes in reference levels can impact 
the effectiveness of incentive contracts.   
6.3 Limitations 
This study‟s findings and conclusions should be considered in light of its 
limitations.  First, the projects presented to participants were the same in every period to 
allow for comparisons between periods.  Therefore, participants could have become 
familiar with the projects that were presented.  The order of project presentation, 
however, was varied in order to decrease this possibility and an ordering variable was not 
statistically significant in any hypotheses tests.   
Second, student proxies were used as managers.  However, this limitation may not 
have a large impact on the results.  Although prior research suggests using student 
proxies may results in a different magnitude of results, the interpretation of the results is 
generally the same (Trottier and Gordon 2011).  In addition, prior research suggests that 
students are likely to be better surrogates for managers involving decision-making tasks 
(Ashton and Kramer 1980; Houghton and Hronsky 1993).  Lastly, experience in selecting 
112 
 
projects is consistent with individuals selecting from a series of lotteries.  Therefore, 
experience in selecting lotteries is not expected to interact with any variables of interest 
(Peecher and Solomon 2001).   
Another limitation is how reference levels were measured.  Prior research 
investigating reference levels is limited.  The question used to assess reference levels was 
derived from prior research examining reference levels in stock valuation decisions 
(Arkes et al. 2010).  Using only one measure to assess reference levels, however, has its 
drawbacks.  Ideally a number of questions would have been asked and a factor score of 
reference level would have been created.  However, validated questions of reference 
levels are scarce and subsequently only one question was used in this study.  Therefore, 
more research is needed to develop more comprehensive measures of reference levels and 
future expectations. 
The last limitation to note is the measurement of future expectations.  This 
measure was assessed using a single question.  Again, this could explain why there were 
no significant results relating to future expectations as a measure.  Also, it is possible that 
the wording of the question led to confusion among the participants as many participants 
answered with the same amount for reference level and future expectations.  This 
limitation, however, presents an opportunity for future research, as discussed in the next 
section. 
 6.4 Future Research 
The results of this study may provide some future research opportunities.  More 
research is warranted to identify the behavioral impact of budget target difficulty on risk 
taking behavior.  The results of this study and prior research supports the security-
113 
 
potential/aspiration level theory predictions that easy budget target goals lead to more 
risk taking behavior than moderate budget target goals (Sprinkle et al. 2008).  Research 
also supports prospect theory predictions that difficult budget targets lead to more risk 
taking than easy budget target goals (Chow et al. 2007).  Research attempting to identify 
boundary conditions for budget target difficulty and its positive impact on risk taking is 
warranted, especially considering the number of companies that use budget targets in 
compensation contracts (Murphy 2001; Sprinkle and Williamson 2004; Fisher et al. 
2008).   
Future research could also investigate the link between reference levels and 
decision making.  The results of this study do not provide a definite link between 
reference levels and decision making that is proposed by numerous decision making 
theories.  Specifically, both prospect theory and security-potential/aspiration level theory 
propose that individual make decisions based upon their reference level.  More research 
investigating this link is warranted. 
Future research could also examine the process through which individuals‟ 
reference levels change.  Specifically, research could investigate whether expectations-
based reference-dependent preferences is a descriptive theory of the process through 
which reference levels change.  This study does not have enough data to conduct this 
analysis but research addressing this issue would be critical to furthering our knowledge 
about reference levels and their impact on behavior. 
An additional avenue for future research would be further examination of how 
reference levels change.  This study provided evidence that expectations of future 
economic outcomes impact individuals‟ reference levels.  Future studies should examine 
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whether this is also true in compensation contracts where an explicit reference level is not 
as apparent as they are in budget-based contracts. 
Lastly, future research should also begin to develop more measures of reference 
levels and future expectations.  In this study, reference levels and future expectations 
were assessed with a single question.  More specifically, reference levels were assessed 
with a one-dimensional measure designed to capture individuals‟ indifference point.  
Reference levels, however, are complex in nature and future research could begin to 
assess multi-dimensional measures.  Multi-dimensional measures could be more 
representative of reference levels as a whole compared to measures that only assess 
individuals‟ indifference points.   Overall, there is much that is not known about 
reference levels and future research could begin to investigate reference levels more. 
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Experiment Procedures 
1. Introduction a. General Instructions/Informed Consent 
b. Informed will be paid for participation 
 
2. Letter Decoding a. Instructions 
b. Perform a one minute training session and receive feedback 
c. Informed of performance requirement to decode fifty-five 
letters to numbers in the main letter decoding session 
d. Complete three minute main letter decoding session 
e. Feedback on performance in main session and whether the 
performance requirement was satisfied 
 
3. Risk Preference 
and Loss 
Aversion Tasks 
a. Informed of compensation for risk preference and loss 
aversion tasks 
b. Example of task selection 
c. Compensation question 
d. Risk preference task (Holt and Laury 2002) 
e. Loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011) 
 
4. Main 
Experiment 
Instructions 
a. Assume role of product manager 
b. Two product selections will be randomly chosen and 
experiment compensation will be based on these selections 
c. Conversion rate of experimental currency 
 
5. Background for 
main 
experiment 
a. Background of ABC Company, compensation contract, 
manipulation of budget target, and reminder of conversion 
rate 
 
6. Product 
Examples 
a. Two examples of product selection with detailed description 
of information presented 
b. Two additional examples with three understanding 
questions for each example 
 
7. Main 
Experiment 
a. Reminder of role, contract, and budget target level 
b. Baseline reference level question and compensation 
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question 
c. Period 1 product elimination phase 
d. Period 1 product selection 
e. Feedback on period 1  
f. Reference level and future expectations questions 
g. Repeat for periods 2 – 5 
h. Post experiment questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
Instructions: 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research study. The purpose of this study is to 
obtain information about decision makers. You will be asked to assume the role of a 
product manager throughout the entire study. You will be asked to perform multiple 
tasks and to provide your perceptions based on information provided during the task. The 
information provided in the set of materials is intended to be representative rather than 
complete. Please be sure to base your opinions and perceptions only on the information 
provided in this case. There are no right or wrong answers.  Please carefully read all 
information provided before responding to the questions. 
  
For your participation you will receive 5 course credit points from your professor. If you 
choose not to participate in this experiment, you may complete a written assignment for 
the 5 points.  You will also have the opportunity to earn monetary compensation for your 
participation in this experiment based on the choices you make as a product manager.  
Your responses are confidential. No identifying information will be used.  
Your participation in this study should take approximately one hour. Your participation is 
voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential. 
The person in charge of this research study is Lee Kersting, and he is called the Principal 
Investigator. However, other research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of the 
person in charge. This research is considered minimal risk. The risks from participating 
in this study are not more than would be encountered in everyday life. Your participation 
in this study will help advance the body of knowledge regarding the business profession. 
You may choose not to participate in this study. Refusal to take part in this study will 
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. Your 
decision to participate or not participate, or a decision to withdraw from the study after 
having agreed to participate, will not affect your student status. You may discontinue 
participation in this study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
may otherwise be entitled. 
This study, titled “Individual Decision Making,” is an approved IRB study.  If you have 
any questions or concerns about this study, please contact Lee Kersting at 813-974-7340. 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or 
complaints, concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research 
study, call the Division of Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South 
Florida at 813-974-5638. 
By proceeding to the next page, you are agreeing to participate in this study. 
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Letter Decoding Instructions 
 
Your first task involves decoding letters to numbers.  Shown below is a screen shot of the 
application you will be using: 
Decoding Task Screen 
 
 
 
As you can see, the screen is split into two frames. In the top frame, you will see a 
“decoding key,” which indicates the correspondence between letters and numbers.  The 
input window is in the bottom frame, where you see the time remaining and one input 
box. Your task is to enter the letter that corresponds to the number in the input box 
and press ‘Enter’ to submit. 
 
In the above example, the number 29 corresponds to the letter k by referencing the 
decoding key.  So you would put k in the text box.  You would then press „Enter,‟ which 
will result in submitting your input.  You will immediately know whether you were 
correct or wrong.  Once you hit „Enter‟ a new number will appear and you will decode 
the new number in the same fashion. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  If you have no questions, click on the 
link below to proceed (do not attempt to “use” the screen shown above - - it is just a 
screen shot!).  You will be taken to a screen where you will perform the decoding task, as 
explained above. 
 
 
 
 
Click Here to Proceed 
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Will perform a one-minute letter-decoding task as a training session  
 
DECODING TASK TRAINING DONE 
You are done with the training session to become familiar with the decoding task. 
 
Your performance is summarized below: 
Number correctly decoded:  7  
Number incorrectly decoded:  0  
If you do not understand any aspect of the decoding task, please raise your hand. 
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Now that you have completed the training session and are familiar with the letter 
decoding task you will complete one more session. 
For completing this portion of the experiment you will earn $2. In order to continue in the 
experiment, you must decode 55 letters over the next three-minute letter decoding 
session. You will have the opportunity to earn significantly more money in the later 
segments of the experiment.  
If you fail to decode 55 letters in the next session you will be asked to leave the 
experiment and receive $2.  
Click Here to Proceed to First Session 
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Main letter decoding session that lasts for three minutes 
 
DECODING TASK SESSION ONE DONE 
You are done with session one of the decoding task. 
 
Your performance is summarized below: 
 
 
 
Click here to proceed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number correctly decoded session one:  77  
Number incorrectly decoded session one:  4  
Passed Performance Threshold: YES 
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Instructions  
Now that you have completed the letter decoding task and successfully passed the 
requirement to remain in the experiment you will be asked to answer a number of 
questions. 
In the following pages you will be presented with two tasks. These tasks will present 
options like the example presented below. For each task there will be ten sets of options 
presented. You will be required to select one of the two options in each row. One of the 
ten sets of options from each task will be selected for compensation, which means the 
outcome of your selection will be simulated and you will earn the outcome in $US 
Dollars. 
Example 
 
 
0/10 of $3.00 + 10/10 of $2.00 
or 
 
 
0/10 of $6.00 + 10/10 of $.15 
The example above presents two options.  
The option on the left has a 0% chance of you winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning 
$2.  
The option on the right has a 0% chance of winning $6 and a 100% chance of winning 
$0.15.  
If you selected the option on the left, then you would possibly receive $2 for this 
selection. 
The next two pages contain a number of options similar to the example presented above. 
For each row select the option you prefer. 
For each of the two tasks on the following pages, one ROW from each task will be 
selected and you will be compensated based on the outcome of your selection. 
Therefore, if the above example were the row selected for actual compensation you 
would earn $2, which you WILL receive at the end of the experiment. 
When you are ready to begin click on the Next button below. 
Next 
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Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options. For an individual task 
(ten sets of options), how many rows will be randomly selected for compensation? 
 
1 
  2 
  3 
  5 
  7 
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Risk preferences task (Holt and Laury 2002) 
For EACH of the following ten choices (One choice per ROW), please indicate which of the two 
options you would prefer by selecting your preference.  
   OPTION A   
 OPTION B 
 
Example 
 
0/10 of $3.00 + 10/10 of $2.00 or 0/10 of $4.00 + 10/10 of $.15 
 
You should make TEN choices, one for each pair of options. 
 
1 
 
0/10 of $4.00 + 10/10 of $3.20 or 0/10 of $7.70 + 10/10 of $.20 
 
2 
 
1/10 of $4.00 + 9/10 of $3.20 or 1/10 of $7.70 + 9/10 of $.20 
 
3 
 
2/10 of $4.00 + 8/10 of $3.20 or 2/10 of $7.70 + 8/10 of $.20 
 
4 
 
3/10 of $4.00 + 7/10 of $3.20 or 3/10 of $7.70 + 7/10 of $.20 
 
5 
 
4/10 of $4.00 + 6/10 of $3.20 or 4/10 of $7.70+ 6/10 of $.20 
 
6 
 
5/10 of $4.00 + 5/10 of $3.20 or 5/10 of $7.70 + 5/10 of $.20 
 
7 
 
6/10 of $4.00 4/10 of $3.20 or 6/10 of $7.70 + 4/10 of $.20 
 
8 
 
7/10 of $4.00 + 3/10 of $3.20 or 7/10 of $7.70 + 3/10 of $.20 
 
9 
 
8/10 of $4.00 + 2/10 of $3.20 or 8/10 of $7.70 + 2/10 of $.20 
 
10 
 
9/10 of $4.00 + 1/10 of $3.20 or 9/10 of $7.70 + 1/10 of $.20 
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Loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011) 
For EACH of the following ten choices (One choice per ROW), please indicate which of 
the two options you would prefer by selecting your preference.  
The numbers presented in parentheses represent negative numbers. Therefore, if you 
selected the option on the left in the example below, you would have a 50% change of 
winning $5.00 and a 50% chance of losing $1.50.  
 OPTION A   OPTION B 
 
Example 
 
50% of $5.00 + 50% of ($1.50) or 50% of $1.00 + 50% ($1.00) 
 
You should make TEN choices, one for each pair of options. 
 
1 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($1.87)  or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
2 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.00) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
3 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.13) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
4 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.33) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
5 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.53) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
6 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.80) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
7 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($3.20) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
8 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($3.87) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
9 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($5.27) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
 
10 
 
50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($9.33) or 50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33) 
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Main experiment instruction page 
You will now be asked to read information relating to a Company and assume the role of 
a product manager for this company. You will be asked to make a number of decisions in 
this role of product manager.  
You will be compensated based on the decisions you make and the resulting outcomes. 
Of all the decisions you make relating to ABC Company and the products they produce, 
two of your production decisions will be selected at random. You will be compensated 
based on these two randomly selected decisions in the following segment of the 
experiment.  
All answer you provide related to compensation should be presented in terms of Lira. 
All monetary terms are described in terms of Lira, which is an experimental currency. 
The Lira you earn in the two randomly selected sessions is converted into U.S. dollars at 
a rate of 20,000 Lira to $1. Therefore, if you earn $100,000 Lira in a session this is 
equivalent to $5 which you will receive at the conclusion of the experiment.  
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
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Narrative describing ABC Company - Easy Budget Target (Moderate Budget 
Target) 
Background 
ABC Company produces and manufactures a wide variety of products. As a 
product manager, you are tasked with selecting which product ABC Company should 
manufacture for the year. Following on historical analysis, ABC Company determined 
that each product selected will be manufactured and sold for one year.  
The task of selecting products to manufacture and market is delegated to a 
number of product managers. Each product manager oversees his/her own staff of 
product developers, whose job is to design or seek out potential new products. At the 
beginning of each year, the product development staff for each product manager will 
propose to their product manager seven products. The proposal for each product will 
include the staff's estimate relating to the probability of achieving the budget, the amount 
paid if the budget is not met, and the highest and lowest amounts paid if the budget is 
met. Historically, the product development staff provides highly accurate estimates. 
At the beginning of each year, each product manager is allocated funds to invest 
in one of the seven products. He/she then uses this allocated amount to manufacture and 
market one product out of the seven that his/her staff proposes. All products presented 
cost the same amount to manufacture and market.  
ABC Company pays their product managers a base salary plus a bonus for 
product returns above a budget threshold. ABC Company has determined that you will be 
paid an annual base salary of 15,000 Lira (30,000 Lira) and you will be presented with a 
number of products to choose from. Due to the level of the budget threshold that has been 
set, a majority of the products presented will allow (will not allow) you to attain the 
budget threshold with certainty. 
The experimental currency, Lira, is convertible to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 20,000 
Lira to $1.  
  
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
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Product selection examples with detailed description – Moderate Budget Target 
Example of Product Selection 
Presented on the next two pages are two example products that a product manager could 
select from. The information is compiled by the product development staff and is 
presented in summary format. The format and presentation style will be the same in 
future exposures to product selection decisions. Recall that the monetary values presented 
are Lira, a form of experimental currency. 
 Product X   
Probability of Meeting the Budget 65% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met 30,000  
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 170,000 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 252,308 
For Product X, the probability of not meeting the budget is 35%. 
As can be seen for Product X, there is a 65% chance that this project will allow the 
product manager to meet his/her budget threshold. Therefore, there is a 35% chance that 
this product will not allow the manager to achieve his/her budget threshold. If the budget 
threshold is not met then the manager will receive his/her base salary. 
For Product X, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is 30000. 
If the budget threshold is not met then a manager receives only his/her annual base salary. 
In this case, if the budget threshold is not met, then the manager will receive 30000 Lira.  
For Product X, the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met is 211,154. 
If the budget threshold is met, then the product manager will receive some amount of 
payment ranging from 170,000 Lira (lowest amount paid if budget is met) to 252,308 
Lira (highest amount paid if the budget is met) with each amount between the lowest and 
highest payoff being equally likely. Therefore, if the budget threshold is met, a product 
manager has equal probability of earning all amounts ranging from 170,000 Lira to 
252,308 Lira.  
Thus, the average payment for meeting the budget threshold would be 211,154 Lira 
((170,000 + 252,308) / 2). 
Additionally, the product manager's base salary is included in the lowest and highest 
amounts paid if the budget is met.  
When you are ready to proceed, hit Next 
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Product Y   
Probability of Meeting the Budget 100% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met N/A 
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 125,000 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 205,000 
For Product Y, the probability of not meeting the budget is 0%. 
As can be seen for Product Y, there is a 100% chance that this project will allow the 
product manager to meet his/her budget threshold. Therefore, there is a 0% chance that 
this product will not allow the manager to achieve his/her budget threshold. If the budget 
threshold is not met then the manager will receive his/her base salary.  
For Product Y, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is N/A. 
If the budget threshold is not met then a manager receives only his/her annual base salary. 
In this case, because there is a 0% chance that this product will cause a manager to miss 
their budget threshold, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is not available 
because this will not happen.  
For Product Y, the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met is 165000. 
Because the budget threshold will be met, the product manager will receive some amount 
of payment ranging from 125,000 Lira (lowest amount paid if budget is met) to 205,000 
Lira (highest amount paid if budget is met) with each amount between the lowest and 
highest payoff being equally likely. Therefore, because the budget target will be met, a 
product manager has equal probability of earning all amounts ranging from 125,000 Lira 
to 205,000 Lira.  
Thus, the average payment for meeting the budget threshold would be 165,000 Lira 
((125,000 + 205,000) / 2).  
Additionally, the product manager's base salary is included in the lowest and highest 
amounts paid if the budget is met.  
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
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Product examples and understanding questions – Moderate Budget Target 
In your answers percentages (%) and commas for Lira are not necessary and 
may interfere with you correctly answering the questions. Please just enter a 
number amount (ex, 25 or 100000) or N/A where applicable.  
 Example of Project Selection 
Product A   
Probability of Meeting the Budget 70% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met 30,000  
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 180,000 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 237,144 
For Product A, the probability of not meeting the budget is %      
For Product A, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is Lira      
For Product A, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met? 
Lira      
  
Product B   
Probability of Meeting the Budget 100% 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met N/A 
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 145,000 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met 185,000 
For Product B, the probability of not meeting the budget is %      
For Product B, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is  Lira      
For Product B, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met? 
Lira      
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Reminder of instructions, manipulation, and compensation 
 
Business Simulation 
Please assume the role of a product manager of the ABC Company. For this simulation 
you will be asked to make decisions in this role. The decisions you make will impact the 
amount of compensation you receive. Recall that two randomly selected decisions will 
be chosen that will be the basis of your experimental compensation. 
All of the preceding information, including product manager's responsibilities, the 
company's situation and desires, and how product managers are evaluated and paid, will 
apply. 
The company has allocated funds to you, the product manager, to manufacture and 
market a product in this period. 
ABC Company has determined that you will be paid an annual base salary of 30,000 Lira 
and you will be presented with a number of products to choose from. Due to the level of 
the budget threshold that has been set, a majority of the products presented will not allow 
you to attain the budget threshold with certainty. 
Your product development staff has proposed seven new products for this period. The 
information for each product is presented on the next page. 
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
 
 
 
 
 
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
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Baseline reference level question and Experiment Compensation Question 
 
Before beginning the main experiment please answer the following question: 
  
At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion? 
in Lira  
Of all the product selection decisions you will make, how many will be randomly 
selected and used as a basis for your experimental compensation?  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 5 
 10 
 
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next 
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Product Selection Task - Period 1 
Please indicate which products you would NOT consider selecting by clicking on the box 
above the products presented. 
On the next page you will actually select which product you want to manufacture and 
market. 
On this page you are selecting which products you would not consider selecting. 
By clicking on the box above a product you are indicating you WOULD NOT consider 
selecting that product. 
        
 
A B C D E F G 
Probability of Meeting the 
Budget 
75% 100% 55% 65% 100% 70% 60% 
Amount Paid if Budget is 
Not Met 
30,000 N/A 30,000 30,000 N/A 30,000 30,000 
Lowest Amount Paid if 
Budget Is Met 
167,500 182,500 40,000 80,000 180,000 95,000 65,000 
Highest Amount Paid if 
Budget Is Met 
305,833 187,500 583,636 456,923 190,000 407,857 511,667 
  
When you are finished selecting which products you would not consider in your selection 
process hit Next, 
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Product Selection Task - Period 1 
Please select one of the following products to manufacture and market in the current year: 
 
A B C D E F G 
Probability of Meeting the 
Budget 
75% 100% 55% 65% 100% 70% 60% 
Amount Paid if Budget is 
Not Met 
30,000 N/A 30,000 30,000 N/A 30,000 30,000 
Lowest Amount Paid if 
Budget Is Met 
167,500 182,500 40,000 80,000 180,000 95,000 65,000 
Highest Amount Paid if 
Budget Is Met 
305,833 187,500 583,636 456,923 190,000 407,857 511,667 
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
  
Indicate which product you would like to manufacture and market:  
  
When you are satisfied with your decision, click Next 
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Outcome and compensation related information for period 1 
 
Outcome and compensation related information for period 1 
Attained budget target Yes 
Period 1 
222161 
Click next when you are ready to proceed to the next page. 
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Reference level and future expectations questions (t = 1) 
 
Questions: 
At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion? 
 in Lira  
What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next period will be? 
 in Lira 
How confident are you that this outcome will occur? 
5%
 
When you have completed the questions above, click Next 
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Periods 2 – 5 will proceed in the same fashion.  The order of presentation of the 
products will be controlled for. 
Below is an example of the outcome feedback that will be presented in period 3. 
Outcome and compensation related information for period 3 
Attained budget target Yes 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
222161 184513 350741 
Click next when you are ready to proceed to the next page. 
Below is an example of the product selection task in Period 4 
Product Selection Task - Period 4 
Your compensation from period 3 was 350741 
Your compensation from period 2 was 184513 
Your compensation from period 1 was 222161 
Please select one of the following products to manufacture and market in the current year: 
 
B C D E F G 
 
Probability of Meeting the Budget 70% 55% 100% 75% 100% 65% 
 
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met 30,000 30,000 N/A 30,000 N/A 30,000 
 
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is 
Met 
95,000 40,000 180,000 167,500 182,500 80,000 
 
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is 
Met 
407,857 583,636 190,000 305,833 187,500 456,923 
 
 
       
 
       
 
       
 Indicate which product you would like to manufacture and market:  
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After the fifth period ended and participants answered the final reference point and future 
expectation question, they were shown the following screen: 
The main experimental task is complete. You have completed five periods, of which two 
will be  
randomly selected for compensation. You will be informed of the rounds selected and 
your total compensation for your participation at the conclusion of the experiment. 
  
When you are ready to continue click Next 
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Post experimental questionnaire 
 
Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target would 
be attained? 
 
Most Few  
 
 
Submit Answ er
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Demographic Questions 
 
Gender M F  
 
Age  
 
Years of full time equivalent work experience years.  
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1) The level of my budget threshold allowed me to easily attain my budget threshold. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
2) My evaluation of products depended on the level of my budget threshold. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
3) Meeting the budget threshold was important to me. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
4) To what extent did the level of the budget threshold affect your product selection? 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
5) I felt that meeting the budget threshold was difficult. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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6) I took the experiment seriously. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
7) It was easy to understand the experimental instructions. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
8) There were too many products to select from. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
9) I felt the task was a good representation of the real world. 
Not at all 
   
Moderately 
   
Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Compensation Page 
A summary of your earned compensation is displayed below: 
Phase of Experiment Lira Earned U.S. Dollars Earned 
Letter Decoding N/A $2 
Risk Preferences N/A $4.00 
Loss Aversion N/A $6.67 
Main Experiment Period 5 468144 $23.41 
Main Experiment Period 2 184513 $9.23 
Total Compensation    
 
$45.31 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
Please print this page and bring it to the experimenter to receive your experimental 
compensation 
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June 19, 2012 
 
Lee Kersting 
School of Accountancy 
4202 E. Fowler Ave., BSN 3413 
Tampa, FL 33620 
RE:  Exempt Certification for IRB#: Pro00007985 
Title:  The Longitudinal Effectiveness of Incentive Contracts: The Impact of Reference 
Levels 
Dear Mr. Kersting: 
On 6/16/2012 the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets USF 
requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations at 
45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, 
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the 
human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of 
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research 
is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined 
in the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. Please note that changes to 
this protocol may disqualify it from exempt status.  Please note that you are responsible for 
notifying the IRB prior to implementing any changes to the currently approved protocol. 
 
The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a period of five 
years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final Progress Report is received, 
whichever is longer.  If you wish to continue this protocol beyond five years, you will need to 
submit a continuing review application at least 60 days prior to the exemption expiration date.  
Should you complete this study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a 
request to close the study. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the 
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
John A. Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
